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Higher education has changed dramatically in the last 40 years. What was
the privilege of rich nations or poor countries’ elites is now an integral part of inter-
national competition and development strategies. However, the rapid expansion in
enrollment has posed significant challenges in terms of providing adequate financ-
ing, access and securing quality in higher education. This dissertation explores three
aspects of these relevant issues.
The first chapter presents new estimates of the returns to higher education in
two Latin American countries, Chile and Perú. Combining administrative records
with a simple economic framework, I document large heterogeneity in the average
returns to higher education, and I find negative net benefits of pursuing a number
of degrees.
The second chapter studies a potential unintended consequence of student
loans. Overall, student loans have proven to be effective in increasing college enroll-
ment, especially among low-income students. Yet, loans’ ability to improve student
welfare depends on the pricing response of schools. If schools exert some degree of
market power and set tuition strategically, they may react to loans by raising tuition
in order to capture some portion of the aid. This generates a negative externality on
ineligible students, who have to pay higher tuition fees than if loans did not exist. I
develop an econometric model of supply and demand for higher education and study
this phenomenon in the context of a student loan program that was implemented
in Chile in 2006. I find that, on average, schools raise tuition by 6% in response to
loans, which generate an average externality of US$178 per student per year.
Finally, the third chapter studies the endogenous formation of centralized ad-
missions to college and its potential benefits. Policymakers around the world have
adopted market-design-inspired centralized matching systems for assigning students
to public schools. However, the question of whether policy intervention is necessary
for such adoptions has been little studied. Examining a setting with application
costs and heterogeneity in college quality, I show that sizeable application costs and
small heterogeneity in college quality may lead to a voluntary transition to a cen-
tralized matching system. Using a 2012 system change in Chile, I demonstrate the
plausibility of our theoretical setting and show that the enlarged pool of colleges in
the centralized admission is welfare-improving, particularly for those students facing
high application costs.
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Chapter 1: The Economic Returns to Higher Education in Latin Amer-
ica: The cases of Chile and Perú
Note: This chapter is coauthored with Sergio Urzúa.
1.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC) expanded their higher education coverage significantly. In 1991 the enroll-
ment rate in post-secondary education (ISCED 5 to 8) in the region was only 17%
but had reached 43.8% by 2013. Chile and Colombia emerge as two good exam-
ples of this trend. In the same period, their enrollment rate in higher education
increased by 301% and 241%, respectively. By 2013 these rates had already reached
50% in Colombia and 83.8% in Chile, rates that are comparable to the levels ob-
served in many developed nations. Figure 1.1 shows these trends, which also show
that enrollment rates in LAC increased faster than the world average.
More recently, Perú had joined Chile and Colombia in their efforts to increase
coverage. As Figure 1.1 shows, while in the middle of the 90s its enrollment rate
was approximately 25% and by 2010 it had reached 40%.
These achievements have been received with optimism in the region, particu-
1
Figure 1.1: Enrollment in Tertiary Education (%)
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (World Education Indicators
Programme). See also González-Velosa et al. (2015).
larly among policy makers. Increases in higher education coverage were to a great
extent the result of public policies designed to facilitate access to the system and
promote human capital accumulation in economies characterized by large deficits of
productive labor. Greater financial support for students and the geographical ex-
pansion of higher education institutions (HEI) (most notably Chile and Colombia)
during the first decade of the new millennium are examples of these efforts.1 And
although Perú did not share those efforts then, the country is now eliciting similar
efforts.
And, of course, a greater access to higher education was expected to bring
1Between 2009 and 2013, the amount of public resources allocated to student financial aid in
Chile increased from US$495 million to US$1.458 million.
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significant economic and equity gains. In particular, public policies were designed
and implemented under the assumption that first generations of college graduates,
particularly those coming from vulnerable households, would be shielded against
the effects of poverty and inequality. However, this optimistic view is now being
weakened. There is a growing concern that the expansion in coverage has been ac-
companied by deterioration in the quality of the system. This phenomenon explains,
at least partially, the massive student protests observed in Chile and Colombia dur-
ing the last five years.
Concerns about the decline in the quality of higher education are not limited
to countries like Chile, Colombia or Perú, but extend to the rest of the region. The
well-documented reduction in the returns to higher education in most countries in
LAC could be explained, to some extent, by worsening in the quality of the system
(Aedo and Walker, 2012; Lustig et al., 2013; Rodríguez et al., 2016). With coverage
expansion, institutions and students of lower than marginal quality may have entered
the system.2
The objective of this paper is to analyze the economic returns to higher edu-
cation in Chile and Perú. By following Willis and Rosen (1979) and Heckman et al.
(2006), we provide a theoretical framework to evaluate the returns to higher edu-
2Figure 1.2 illustrates this point. The figure shows the percentage of fifteen year-old students
scoring at the top level in PISA test (level 6 in 2010) as a function of GDP. Low scores in in
Latin America shows the lack of readiness among high school students few years before enrolling
in college. We observe that Latin American countries are well behind most developed economies.
The result, could explain why, in spite of the dramatic increases in educational coverage, labor
productivity in LAC has grown at an exceedingly slow pace.
3
Figure 1.2: Top scoring students in PISA 2010 test and GDP
Note: Circle size shows the population of students in each country.
Data Source: OECD
4
cation. By using publicly available data on tuition costs and estimations for future
earning for graduates from these two countries, we estimate the financial return to
different higher education programs. These calculations allow evaluating the finan-
cial advantage of pursuing different degrees to alternative careers paths such as not
pursuing postsecondary studies at all.3
The simple but comprehensive economic approach and the use of publicly
available data make our methodology easy to understand. In this context, our cal-
culations could potentially be replicated by families, students, researchers and policy
makers. Our empirical results will have substantial implications for public policies.
A first point that emerges from this is the importance of further efforts to construct
and disseminate information on the performance of higher education graduates in
the labor market. In this context, our results highlight the importance of using
precise and reliable information on labor market outcomes in the design of higher
education policies. This new evidence will also call into question the benefits of the
policies implemented in Latin America, which aim at expanding coverage of higher
education without assuring its quality and relevance of educational programs. There
was a dramatic expansion in access to a system that often failed in its promise to
improve the economic conditions of those who decided to invest in higher education.
This document is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces our empirical
model and fits it in the context of the literature, Section 1.3 describes the sources
3The literature analyzing the returns to education is vast. Recent papers analyzing this topic
includes: Andrews et al. (2014); Hastings et al. (2013a); Arcidiacono et al. (2012); Kaufmann et
al. (2013); Gallego (2012), among others.
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of information. Section 1.4 describes the empirical implementation. In section 1.5
we present our main results and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Methodology
We follow the recent literature and postulate a simple econometric model al-
lowing the estimation of the financial net returns to higher education (Urzúa, 2012;
González-Velosa et al., 2015). As described below, we study the impact of labor
market experience on future earnings using a Mincer-type regressions framework.
Then, we combine these estimates with administrative information on labor market
outcomes for recent cohorts of college graduates to predict the stream of earnings
throughout life, which allows us to estimate the net returns to postsecondary de-
grees.
Importantly, our estimated returns must be interpreted with caution. They
are intended to identify the average economic gain of those individuals graduating
from a specific degree in a particular type institution versus their alternative of
becoming a worker with a high school degree. In this context, our estimates neither
represent the average effect of the marginal individual who is indifferent between
college versus high school (Carneiro et al., 2011), nor the internal rate of return
(Heckman et al., 2006).
Now, we present our framework to study the returns to postsecondary degrees.
Let I be the set of programs and J the set of HEIs in a particular country. For
simplicity, we assume that all programs are offered across all types of HEIs. Then,
6
the overall supply of postsecondary degrees is the set of all possible tuples (i, j).
Equation 1.1 presents our definition of the returns to pursuing program i ∈ I in
institution j ∈ J , for student k.
rp(i, j, k) =
NPV (i, j, k)−NPVp(k)
NPVp(k)
(1.1)
NPV (i, j, k) denotes the expected net present value of earnings if pursuing
program i in institution j for student k. NPVp(k) represents the present value of
not pursuing higher education studies after high school for the same individual. The
subscript p refers to the pth percentile of the income distribution of workers holding
a high school degree (without postsecondary education).
Specifically, NPV (i, j, k) is the discounted sum of all future expected earnings
after graduating from program i in institution j, discounting the effective tuition
costs, as defined by equation 1.2.











,where Yi,j(t) is the average annual income of graduates from program i in institution
j, t years after graduation. C(i, j) is the annual direct cost of pursuing program i
in institution j (tuition fees), which we assume do not change over time. r is the
discount rate, di,j is the program’s formal duration and Rk is the number of years
between the moment student k enters the program and his/her retirement.
On the other hand, the denominator of equation 1.1, NPVp(k), denotes the
present value of earnings associated with the alternative of not pursuing higher
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, where Yp(t) represents the income level at the pth percentile t after years high
school graduation for those worker that did not pursue higher education studies. R′k
is the number of years between high school graduation and retirement.
Therefore rp(i, j, k) identifies the percentage increase in lifetime earnings of
pursuing (i, j) versus the alternative of not pursuing any postsecondary degree. As
extensively discussed in the literature, the self-selection of individuals into college
prevents the interpretation of mean differences in labor income between individuals
with and without postsecondary degrees as the effect of education on labor market
outcomes. In this context, by modifying p we can empirically assess the potential
role of selection.
1.2.1 Identification Argument
With the model of counterfactual outcomes we can proceed to define the treat-
ment effect of interest. If we let E[A|B] be the conditional expectation of A con-
ditional on B, and D(i, j, k) be an indicator function, such that D(j, i, k) = 1 if
individual k graduates from program i in institution j, and D(j, i, k) = 0 otherwise.
The treatment effect of interest is defined by Equations 1.4 and 1.5.
∆(i, j) = E[NPV (i, j, k)NPV (k)|D(i, j, k) = 1] (1.4)
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∆(i, j) = E[NPV (i, j, k)|D(i, j, k) = 1]− E[NPV (k)|D(i, j, k) = 1] (1.5)
, where NPV (k) is the expected net present discounted value associated with the
alternative “high school degree” but calculated for those individuals with a college
degree from program i in institution j. Notice that this term is unobserved. One
alternative would be the substitution of this term by the average net present dis-
counted value estimated from the sample of high school graduates without college
experience. This, however, would produce biased and inconsistent results due to
the selfselection of individuals into higher education degrees and institutions (Willis
and Rosen, 1979). In this paper, we use a different approach. Following the in-
stitution in Neal (2004), we approximate E[NPVp(k)|D(i, j, k) = 1] using different
percentiles of the distribution of earnings, NPVp(k). Conceptually, this approach
assumes that the relevant comparison group for those obtaining a college degree is
not the average high school graduate, but high school graduates obtaining earnings
in the p percentile of the distribution. In our empirical implementation, we use the
75th percentile.
1.3 Sources of Information
1.3.1 Chile
We employ three different sources of information for Chile. The primary
dataset are administrative records from the Higher Education Information System
9
(SIES). The SIES is a public entity within the Ministry of Education that manages
official higher education statistics, gathering information on all public and private
higher education institutions in the country, including institutions offering two-year
college degrees (Technical Training Centers), four-year college degrees (Professional
Institutes) and five-year college degrees (Universities).
We use this data to obtain student-level enrollment data for the year 2012.
For this years, we observe the program students are enrolled in. Importantly, the
dataset includes, gender, age, region of residence, high school characteristics, SES
background and high school GPA. Furthermore, the data contains substantial in-
formation on the characteristics of the programs, such as duration, geographical
location and tuition costs.
Second, we use datat from the portal mifuturo.cl, which provides salaries for
information after four years of graduation for 1069 degrees in Chile. Salaries are
reported by institution and by field of study using the ISCED classification.
Finally, we use the 2013 Chilean household survey “CASEN”, which allows us
to estimate earning profiles for different types of graduates. It also allows us to
estimate the salaries of workers that did not attend higher education (high school
graduates).
Our empirical analysis is carried out using student-level data including the
degree and institution in which students are enrolled, and individual background
variables. We match their enrollment decisions with their corresponding expected
salaries to estimate the returns for each student.
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics of our key variables.
10
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Chile
Type of HEI
TTC PI Univ.
(2yr degrees) (4yr degrees) (5yr degrees)
PANEL A. Supply Side
# of HEIs 56 40 58
# of Field 191 141 434
Average tuition (USD) $2,602 $2,694 $5,423
Average duration 2.42 3.18 4.6
# of campuses 167 178 219
Average years of accreditation 1.24 1.68 3.33
PANEL B. Demand Side
# of students 62,282 111,240 152,832
% of total enrollment (market share) 19.10% 34.10% 46.80%
% female 52% 51% 52%
Average PSU score 406.55 412.06 519.95
Student Composition
% Public Schools 45% 41% 28%
% Voucher Schools 53% 56% 56%
% Private Schools 2% 3% 16%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on administrative records.
Note: “TTC” stands for Technical Training Centers, “PI” stands for Professional
Institutes, and “Univ.” for universities.
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As previously explained, types of higher education institutions are defined by
the types of degrees they offer. On the other hand, the taxonomy for fields of
education follows the International Standard Classification of Education: Fields of
Education and Training (ISCEF-F), and we incorporate some adjustments made by
the Ministry of Education of Chile. In our analysis, we distinguish ten different
fields of study across the three different types of higher education institutions.
1.3.2 Perú
Our primarily data source is the portal ponteencarrera.pe, an official website
gathering detailed information on 3957 tertiary education programs in Perú.4
As explained below, this source allows us to identify the key input variables
for the estimation of the returns to higher education, distinguishing three different
types of HEIs: Universities, “Higher Education Technological Institutes”(IEST) and
“Higher Education Institutes” (ISE). The latter two offer technical and vocational
programs in different fields.5 These programs are typically of shorter duration and
less expensive than those offered by universities. For all our analysis the last two
categories are merged into a category called “Vocational”.
The website ponteencarrera.pe was launched in July of 2015 and reports infor-
mation on variables such as: tuition costs, duration and total enrollment for each
4The portal ponteencarrera.pe is a joint initiative of the Department of Education, the Depart-
ment of Labor and a private corporation (IPAE Acción Empresarial).
5Institutos de Educación Superior Técnológico and Institutos Superiores de Educación, respec-
tively.
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degree. It also includes information on their geographic location, field of study, as
well as a measure of their selectivity. This index seeks to provide information on
the demand for each specific degree, a proxy for quality, and it is constructed as the
ratio of the number of admitted students to the number of applicants.
The dataset also contains information on graduates’ salaries after graduation.
However, this information is available only for 424 programs. Specifically, the web-
site reports average monthly salaries over the first four years after high school grad-
uation. Finally, salaries are reported at field of study-level (not a the program-level)
within institutions. According to the official disclaim, this aggregation secures the
representativeness of the information.
Our second data source is the 2014 Peruvian national survey “ENAHO”. We
use this household survey to construct counterfactual salaries for those individuals
graduating from postsecondary institutions had they not attended college.
It is worth mentioning that unlike Chile, individual-level administrative in-
formation is not available in Perú. Hence, we only estimate returns at the field of
study-level. We can identify 79 fields of study. For practical reasons, we collapse
them into 6 broader fields that match the fields of work used in the ENAHO survey.
Table 1.2 shows descriptive statistics of our level data.
1.4 Estimation
The main empirical challenge is the estimation of Yi,j(t), for t = 1...Rk. Our
datasets include information on graduates’ average earnings t̄ years after graduation,
13
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Perú
University Vocational/Technical Total
PANEL A: Institutions
# of HEI 121 748 869
% Public 32.20% 47.30% 45.20%
Market Share (%) 55.50% 44.50% -
PANEL B. Programs
# of programs 1519 2438 3957
Duration (avg.) 5.13 3.05 3.85
Annual tuition (US$) (avg.) 1243.4 433.5 744.9
Enrollment (avg.) 120.2 62.2 85
Selectivity (%) 62.60% 82.60% 74.70%
Annual Salary (US$) (avg.) 4999 3449 4045
Source: ponteencarrera.pe.
say Yi,j(t̄), which we use to estimate age-earnings profiles until retirement (assumed
to be at age 65). To do this, we follow the steps outlined bellow:
First, using household surveys we estimate the following Mincer equation:
lnYi = α + β1Agei + β2Age
2
i + εi (1.6)
We include individuals 24 to 65 years old, with a post-secondary degree but
who are no currently attending higher education institutions.
Then, we use Yi,j(t̄) and the coefficient estimates from equation 1.6 to predict
Yi,j(t) for all t 6= t̄ as show in 1.7
ˆYi,j(t) = Yi,j(t− 1)eβ̂1+2β̂2×(t−1) (1.7)
This procedure is replicated for workers with different types of degrees. Specif-
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ically, we estimate separate equations using the samples of workers with university
degrees and non-university degrees. This allows us to estimate program-specific
age-earning patterns. Finally, The earning of workers who do not attend tertiary
education, Yp(t), is estimated non-parametrically using household surveys (average
earnings at each experience level). Finally, in all our calculation, we use a discount
rate of 6%.
1.4.1 Missing data
Datasets do not often report all income and tuition information, which are
key variables to estimate the returns to education. Instead of restricting the sample
size to programs with complete information, we rather predict the missing values
of tuition or graduates’ income. To do so, we estimate two simple linear model as
shown in 1.8 and 1.9.
Yi,j(t̄) = δ0 +Xi,jδ1 + ε(i, j) (1.8)
Ci,j = θ0 +Xi,jθ1 + ν(i, j) (1.9)
,where ε(i, j) and ν(i, j) are idiosyncratic error terms, Xi,j are program and insti-
tution characteristics, such as program’s duration, HEI type, field of study fixed
effects and institutions fixed effects. We the use the estimate from 1.8 and 1.9 to
predict (linear projection) the missing values of Yi,j(t̄) and Ci,j.
Despite the limitations imposed by the underlying assumptions, the resulting
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estimates from equation 1.1 allows us to compare the net returns of pursuing a
degree in field i in institution j, versus the alternative of not pursuing that specific
degree and entering the labor force as a high school graduate instead. Our estimates
take into account both the monetary (tuition fees) and opportunity costs of higher
education (foregone earnings).
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Returns to higher education in Chile
We estimate the economic returns to all degrees in Chile. In order to match
information on salaries with individual-level enrollment data, we aggregate the esti-
mates by type of institution and fields of study.6 This allows us to link labor market
outcomes reported four years after graduation with information on the degree (de-
fined by field and institution) pursued by students. In this context, although we are
not fully exploiting the variation across the degrees available, we are able to capture
heterogeneity given the differences in duration and costs( tuition fees) across fields
and institutions.
As described above, to compute net returns we compare the average net present
values of a specific field and institution with the alternative of not pursuing a higher
education degree. For the latter, we use salaries for the 75th percentile of the
distribution (p = 0.75 in Equation 1.3).
Table 1.3 shows the estimates of the Mincer regression (Equation 1.6) used to
6Previous studies have used student-level information on graduation, not enrollment.
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estimate the age-earning profiles.
Table 1.3: Mincer Regressions: Chile
CFT IP University
Age 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.094***
-0.007 -0.006 -0.004
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
0 0 0
Constant 11.590*** 11.566*** 11.371***
-0.152 -0.124 -0.093
R2 0.04 0.04 0.06
N 2,691 4,643 11,028
Note: Regressions only include workers age 24-65 who are not currently studying.
Table 1.4 shows the average returns by field of study and type of institution.
These results suggest that the largest returns are associated with five-year college
degrees in the fields of “Business and administration”, “Law”, “Science" and “Engi-
neering and Technology”. The latter concentrates the highest results across types of
HEIs.
Two other remarkable features of the data emerge from Table 1.4. First,
there is substantial heterogeneity both across fields of study and HEI type. For
example, while the average student following a university degree in “Engineering and
Technology” expects a return of more than 160%, the average student enrolled in
the same type of institution but pursuing a degree in “Humanities” expects a return
of 2.3%. Large differences are also observed across types of HEIs for a particular
field. For example, while a degree in “Health” from a TTC has associated a return
of 40%, a degree in the same field but from a university is expected to “deliver” an
17
Table 1.4: Average Returns by field of study and HEI type: Chile
Type of HEI
TTC PI Univ. Total
(2ry degrees) (4yr degrees) (5yr degrees)
Business & Administration 57.10% 54.60% 126.80% 78.20%
Agriculture 35.30% 42.50% 62.70% 52.50%
Arts 66.10% 31.00% 49.00% 41.20%
Science 97.20% 115.50% 115.30% 113.60%
Social Sciences 34.50% 18.70% 47.00% 36.20%
Law 61.30% 38.60% 128.50% 115.10%
Education -2.40% 9.50% 12.70% 9.60%
Humanities -5.20% 12.10% 2.30% 4.10%
Health 40.50% 40.90% 101.50% 73.30%
Engineering and Technology 109.60% 99.80% 163.50% 125.80%
Total 66.20% 58.90% 97.50% 78.40%
Note: “TTC” stands for Technical Training Centers, “PI” stands for Professional
Institutes, and “Univ.” for universities.
average return of 101%.
Second, returns in many fields and HEI (especially TTC) are negative. Pursu-
ing an Education degree in a TTC has associated an average return of -2.4%. This
means that, on average, students would have been better off (in financial terms)
not pursuing that degree versus the alternative of entering the labor force after
graduating from high school.
As shown in Table 1.5 roughly 10% of the students face negative returns in
Chile when the counterfactual is p = 75. The fraction of students with negative
returns is significantly higher in TTCs and PIs.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show estimated earning streams for students in education
and technology/engineering majors compared to those of worker with completed
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Table 1.5: Negative Returns to Higher Education: Chile
p=50 p=75 p=90
Technical Training Centers 3.20% 15.20% 45.20%
Professional Institutes 2.10% 12.30% 52.20%
Universities 1.00% 5.00% 28.70%
Total 1.80% 9.40% 39.90%
secondary education (high school graduates, HSG) located at different levels of the
income distribution. The former have relatively low earnings, which implies low o
even negative returns. On the contrary, students pursuing degrees in technology
and engineering have much higher salaries than those with a high school degree.
Finally, an in order to study to what extent the heterogeneity reported above
was due to pre-college variables, we compute net returns by type of high schools.7
Table 1.6 shows the net returns to higher education across types of HEI and
school type.
Table 1.6: Negative Returns to Higher Education: Chile
Type of HEI
Technical Training Center Professional Institutes Universities
(2ry degrees) (4yr degrees) (5yr degrees)
Public 71.39% 62.24% 93.66%
Voucher 73.92% 66.97% 97.75%
Private 70.42% 57.34% 133.60%
7Since the early 1980s, schools in Chile can be public, private or state-subsidized (voucher).
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1.5.2 Returns to higher education in Perú
Table 1.7 presents the results from Mincer regressions used to estimate the
age-earning profiles.










As shown in Table 1.8, in Perú returns are substantially lower on average than
in Chile. The average return is 36.8%. Even though estimates still show some degree
of heterogeneity across fields of study, they tend to be more homogeneous than in
Chile. The field that exhibits higher returns is “Sciences/Engineering/Manufacturing”
with a returns of 58% while Education degrees have negative returns. This evidence
is consistent with the patterns found in Chile.
We also found significant differences between public and private institutions.
As shown in Table 1.9, private universities have substantially larger returns and
similar patterns are encountered in vocational and technical programs, respectively.
Next, we analyze the difference in returns across degrees with different levels
of selectivity. In particular, we classify programs in three broad categories. We
define a “highly-selective program” as a program that admits less than one third
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Table 1.8: Average Returns by field of study and HEI type: Perú
HEI Type
Vocational/Technical University Total
Social Sciences/Communications 11.6% 27.8% 27.6%
Education -18.5% -18.5% -18.5%
Others 50.5% 33.0% 43.2%
Health 31.3% 7.1% 18.8%
Business & Administration 31.9% 24.3% 28.6%
Arts & Architecture 16.3% 47.9% 34.6%
Sciences/Engineering/Manufacturing 70.7% 49.4% 58.5%
Total 44.7% 30.5% 36.8%
Table 1.9: Returns in Private and Public Institutions: Perú
Vocational/Technical University
Private Public Private Public
Social Sciences/Communications 12.4% -8.4% 26.4% 31.4%
Education -18.8% -18.4% -22.9% -13.8%
Others 48.1% 57.6% 37.0% 14.1%
Health 27.8% 40.4% 6.3% 9.8%
Business & Administration 28.9% 44.6% 25.3% 20.2%
Arts & Architecture 15.6% 30.3% 47.6% 49.4%
Sciences/Engineering/Manufacturing 60.9% 80.0% 48.8% 50.5%
Total 36.1% 62.8% 30.0% 31.9%
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of its applicants. Similarly, a “non-selective program” admits more than two thirds
of its applicants. Finally “moderately selective programs” admit between one and
two thirds of their pool of applicants. As shown in Table 1.10, we do find a sig-
nificant return premium for highly-selective university programs. However, no such
differences appear in Vocational/Technical institutions.
24
Table 1.10: Average Returns by program selectivity and HEI type: Perú
Vocational/Technical University
Highly Moderately Non-Selective Highly Moderately Non-Selective
Selective Selective Selective Selective
Social Sciences/Communications - 56.6% 8.9% 38.6% 67.7% 15.3%
Education - -25.0% -17.3% -18.0% -21.3% -16.7%
Others - 56.5% 55.1% 18.8% 35.6%
Health 32.5% 40.1% 30.3% 11.4% 6.7% 6.3%
Business & Administration 49.9% 44.6% 30.1% 23.4% 62.8% 18.4%
Arts & Architecture 5.0% 29.1% 16.5% 65.9% 39.4% 42.2%
Sciences/Engineering/Manufacturing 80.5% 75.9% 69.6% 60.4% 63.0% 41.6%
Total 66.1% 54.6% 43.0% 42.5% 45.6% 23.6%
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Finally, we show the age-earning profiles for two different types of programs.
Figure 1.5 shows estimated earnings for students attending education programs. The
dashed lines show earnings of workers with a high school diploma (HSG) at three
percentile levels in the income distribution (90, 75 and the median). The figure
illustrates how poorly these graduates perform in the labor market. Graduates
earn higher salaries than those in the 75th percentile, but do never earn more than
those in the 90th, except for the period while they study. Figure 1.6, on the other
hand, shows estimated earnings of workers graduating from engineering and science
degrees. These graduates earn substantially more than those holding a secondary
education degree.
1.6 Conclusion
Many Latin American countries have implemented policies aimed at promot-
ing access to higher education, and many more will continue doing so in the years
to come. As a result of these changes, the characteristics of the infra-marginal
student in the region has changed. Specifically, each year a larger fraction of indi-
viduals coming from vulnerable households enroll in higher education institutions
in countries such as Chile, Colombia and Perú.
However, despite its political returns, the empirical evidence on economic re-
turns to education suggests caution in continuing this strategy, particularly if quality
assurance in education is not secured. The intuition is simple. To a large extent,
the new generations of higher education students attended low-quality (primary and
26
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secondary) institutions for many years. Therefore, for this group, not any higher ed-
ucation system would guarantee a more promising future. Only one of high quality,
designed to effectively alleviate their lack of skills and provide them with the capac-
ities to success in the labor market, would protect them against adverse economic
circumstances. This paper seeks to shed light into this issue.
Using administrative information, complemented with household surveys, we
estimate the returns to higher education in Chile and Perú. We focus our interest on
a specific parameter, namely the return to education for those individuals obtaining
college degrees (average treatment effect on the treated).
Consistent with previous studies, we document large heterogeneity in the re-
turns in Chile, with a non-trivial fraction of students facing the possibility of negative
net returns. In contrast to the literature, we document returns after controlling for
pre-college variables, including type of high school and proxies for ability. In the
case of Perú, we provide new evidence suggesting that the phenomena documented
in Chile might not be an exception in the region.
Overall, when it comes to the future efforts in the higher education systems
in developing countries, our evidence suggests that securing education quality and
designing efficient financing policies must be top priorities.
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Chapter 2: Loans for College: Strategic Pricing and Externalities
2.1 Introduction
Enrollment rates in higher education have increased significantly in the last
decades. The world average enrollment rate increased from 13.1% in 1990 to 32.9%
in 2013. In the U.S., for example, total enrollment has increased by roughly 250,000
students per year. Likewise, tuition has also risen at a surprisingly high rate. For
instance, after controlling for inflation, average tuition and fees in the U.S. have
tripled in the last 30 years. Governments have typically responded to rising tuition
by increasing student financial aid through the form of grants, scholarships or subsi-
dized loans, which have succeeded in increasing college enrollment, especially among
vulnerable students.
Yet, financial aid’s ability to improve the welfare of students depends in part
on the response of schools. If schools exert some degree of market power, they may
react to more financial aid by raising tuition in order to capture some portion of the
aid. This strategic response of schools generates a negative externality on ineligible
students, who have to pay higher tuition fees than if aid did not exist.
While most papers have focused on the economic impact of student aid on
eligible students (see Kane, 2006; Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005), this paper focuses
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on the spillover effect of student aid on students who do not participate in the
financial aid system.
I first present a simple theoretical framework to understand the mechanisms
through which student aid, and more specifically student loans, can affect the wel-
fare of both eligible and ineligible students. I model the choice of college incorporat-
ing student ability, liquidity constraints and heterogeneous returns to college. The
model shows that if colleges have market power, they will strategically react to loans
by raising tuition by an amount that is inversely proportional to the price elasticity
of demand. Therefore, while loans may allow high-ability, low-income students to
attend college, it reduces the welfare of non-eligible students by pushing tuition up.
Thus, the overall effect on student welfare is ambiguous and remains an empirical
question.
Then, I bring in an econometric model of supply and demand from the In-
dustrial Organization literature to estimate the impact of student loans on tuition.
On the demand side, I model student college choices using a random coefficients
multinomial logit framework in the spirit of McFadden (1973) and Berry (1994).
The indirect utility of choosing a certain school depends on observed and unob-
served characteristics, as well as on individual-specific factors. Following Berry et
al. (1995), I explicitly deal with the endogeneity of tuition arising from the fact that
tuition is correlated with unobserved college characteristics. Since the availability
of student loans may affect the demand elasticities for colleges, the model allows me
to estimate the change in demand elasticities before and after the introduction of
loans.
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On the supply side, I model the pricing behavior of colleges. If tuition fees are
optimally set, changes in the elasticities of demand will affect colleges’ strategies.
Thus, if demand becomes less tuition-sensitive due to loans, colleges may strategi-
cally set higher tuition fees. Therefore, the demand and supply model enables me to
estimate the increase in tuition that can be explained by loans. Finally, since higher
tuition fees are absorbed by all students, I can estimate the cost for ineligible stu-
dents, who face higher tuition fees despite not receiving financial aid. There is one
caveat for interpreting these results in light of the theoretical model. The empirical
results allow me to estimate the effect of loans on tuition but do not allow me to
estimate the effect on student welfare. There may be effects on other dimensions
affecting student welfare that the model does not capture. For example, universi-
ties may increase the quality of their education services by re-investing the extra
resources generated by loans. This effect on quality would off-set the short-run
decrease in student surplus due to higher tuition fees. Also, there could be gen-
eral equilibrium effects in the labor markets due to an increase influx of graduates.
Therefore, the empirical results of this paper should be interpreted as short-run
effects on student surplus when making college decisions.
I empirically estimate the econometric model in the context of a state-guaranteed
student loan program (SGL) implemented in Chile in 2006. The Chilean higher ed-
ucation system provides a suitable environment to study colleges’ response to loans.
First, I have access to a rich dataset containing student applications to colleges
running a centralized admission system. The data also allows me to identify the
students who are eligible for loans. Second, there is detailed supply-side informa-
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tion on the tuition that schools set for different academic programs. Third, the SGL
program was a clear episode of liquidity constraints reduction that allows for a clean
identification of the effect of loans on tuition. I find that on average schools raise
tuition by 6% in response to loans. This generates an average externality on ineli-
gible students of US$178 per student per year, which aggregated across all students
is estimated to be US$9.93 million.
My paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the
literature analyzing college price responses to financial aid. After former U.S. Secre-
tary of Education, William Bennett, declared in 1987 that “increases in financial aid
in recent years have enabled colleges and universities blithely to raise their tuition,
confident that Federal loan subsidies would help cushion the increase ” (Bennett,
1987), a number of papers have studied the validity of this so called “Bennett Hy-
pothesis”, with mixed findings. Singell and Stone (2007) and Stoll et al. (2014), for
example, find little support for financial aid increasing college prices. In contrast,
Long (2004), Cellini and Goldin (2014), Gordon and Hedlund (2016), among others,
find opposing evidence. Turner (2012) and Turner (2014) show that if colleges can
price discriminate and offer various discounts to students through internal grants
and scholarships, financial aid crowds-out institutional aid and does not necessarily
push “list prices” up. In my sample, price discrimination is very limited.1 In that
sense, another advantage of the Chilean framework is that it provides a clear setting
1Price discrimination is not an extended practice in Chilean universities, although there is a
limited number of scholarships that are used to attract high-performing students. Other than that,
students pay the listed tuition and there are no formal price-discrimination mechanisms.
33
that shuts down the crowding-out channel that helps identifying more clearly the
effect of loans on tuition.
My paper also contributes to a growing literature on the economic impact of
student financial aid policies. For example, a number of studies show that liquidity
constraints prevent some relatively able but poor students from enrolling in college
(see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011; Belley and Lochner, 2007; Kane, 1996).
Likewise, other studies show that student aid has allowed low-income students to
access higher education (see Solis, 2016; Rau et al., 2013; Fack and Grenet, 2015;
Dynarski, 2000, 2003; Van der Klauuw, 2002; Leslie and Brinkman, 1987; Ellwood
and Kane, 2000; Heller, 1997; Nurnberg et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2012), although
there is mixed evidence on the impact of financial aid on student college performance
and persistence (see Ferreyra et al., 2016; Capelli and Won, 2016; Deming and
Dynarski, 2009; Castleman et al., 2013; Gross et al., 2007; Cohodes and Goodman,
2014). As opposed to this literature, my paper emphasizes the spillover effects of
student aid on ineligible students.
Finally, my study contributes to the stream of literature studying how financial
aid affects college applications and college choices (see Abraham and Clark, 2006;
Nurnberg et al., 2012; Bettinger et al., 2012). By taking advantage of the fact that
I have access to data containing information on student applications, I am able to
construct precise estimates for the demand for different colleges. Students in my
sample submit a list with preferences to a clearinghouse that then assigns students to
colleges using a student-proposed deferred-acceptance algorithm. Application data
allows me to estimate demand for colleges abstracting from any student selection
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mechanism. In fact, if enrollment data were used to estimate student demand for
colleges, these estimates would confound the effect of preferences with schools’ ca-
pacities and selection processes. For instance, if a certain college has a high demand
but very few seats, the number of applications will exceed the number of students
actually enrolled. If demand were calculated using actual enrollment, we would be
underestimating its true demand. My data allows me to separate these two effects
and focus on the demand side and its pricing implications.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2, I present a simple theoretical
framework that highlights the mechanisms through which colleges may raise tuition
in response to loans and consequently affect student welfare. Section 2.3 describes
the econometric model of demand and supply of higher education. Section 2.4
describes the institutional background and the data for the estimation of the model.
It also provides reduced form evidence that colleges reacted to the SGL by raising
tuition fees. Section 2.5 presents the main results of the paper and Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 A model of student loans and strategic college pricing
To understand the mechanisms through which loans create an externality on
ineligible students, I present a present a simple theoretical model of student loans
for college and optimal college pricing.
I model students’ college choices and incorporate heterogeity in students’ abil-
ity, liquidity constraints and returns to college. When colleges exert some degree
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of market power, they will strategically react to loans by setting a higher tuition.
Therefore, while the loans allow high-ability, low-income students to attend college,
it reduces the welfare of ineligible students who are no t eligible by pushing tuition
fees up.
2.2.1 Setup
There is a infinitely lived continuum of students, indexed by i who differ in their
innate ability, ai. Ability follows a continuously differentiable strictly increasing
cumulative distribution function G with density g with full support over the interval
[a, a]. I assume that each student knows his/her own ability.
In time t = 0, students decide whether or not to get into college. This decision
can only be taken in t = 0 and is assumed to be irreversible.
We assume that there is a single non-selective college (C), which offers a single
degree of duration D and charges a total price p > 0 (tuition fees), to be paid at
the moment of admission. We assume C can accommodate any demand and can
exert control over tuition. The college optimally set p to maximize profits and has
a marginal cost of c dollars per student.
In t = 0, when student decide whether or not to get into college, they maximize
the present discounted value of lifetime earnings.
Let V (a, ρ) be the net present value of labor earnings minus the opportunity
cost of attending college, where ρ is a common inter-temporal discount factor. Let
earnings in year t be yt(a), v the opportunity cost and ζ the non-pecuniary cost of
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attending college, then V (a, ρ) can be written as shown in Equation 2.1.
V (a, ρ) =
∫ ∞
0
(yt(a)− v(a)− ζ(a))e−ρtdt (2.1)
We assume that the gains from attending college versus non attending increases
with ability, thus Va > 0.
Students face short run liquidity constraints when entering college. They have
a disposable income Ii in t = 0, which can be spent to pay for college education.
Students whose income is lower that p cannot attend college. For simplicity, I
assume that income is independent from ability (I ⊥ a), and that income follows
a continuously differentiable strictly increasing cumulative distribution function F




. I also assume that I is
sufficiently large so that there is at least a subset of students who is never capacity
constrained (p < Ii, for some i). Similarly, I assume that I is sufficiently small so
that there are always students who face capacity constraints (p > Ii, for some i) .




, we avoid cases such as nobody attending college ( p > I, for all
i) or everybody going yo college (p < Ii, for all i).
Let Ci be an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if student i attends
college, and 0 if not. We define U as the present discounted value of his/her lifetime
earnings. Students are assumed to choose Ci to maximize:
Ui =

V (ai, ρ)− p if Ci = 1
0 if Ci = 0
(2.2)
, subject to the short-run liquidity constraint p ≤ I.
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2.2.2 Equilibrium without Loans
If students cannot borrow to finance their studies, then only those who benefit
from college and whose income is high enough to pay for tuition can join C. Thus,
student i attends college only if the conditions in Equations (2.3) and (2.4) are
satisfied. From now on, I suppress the subscript i.
V (a, ρ)− p ≥ 0 (2.3)
p ≤ I (2.4)
At a given price p, equation (2.3) defines the ability of the student that just
benefits from college, a∗(p), where
V (a∗, ρ)− p = 0 (2.5)
Thus, only students satisfying a ≥ a∗(p) will consider attending college (solid
area in Figure 2.1). Similarly, (2.4) defines the set of students who have the financial
capacity to pay the fees.






g(x)f(y)dxdy = [1−G(a∗(p))][1− F (p)] (2.6)
38
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium without Loans
Then, C will optimally set p in order to maximize profits (Equation 2.7.
maxp π(p) = (p− c)D(p) (2.7)
The optimal price p∗ satisfies the first order condition in equation (2.8).













Suppose now that loans became available to high-ability, low-income students.
For simplicity, we assume authorities observe p∗ and a∗, and anyone with a ≥ a∗
(high-ability) and I ≤ p∗ (low-income) is eligible for the loan. Let E be the set of
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eligible students and Ec its complement.2
The student loans relaxes the short-run credit constraint in (2.4) in exchange
for a future repayment. Loans have an interest rate r and a fixed repayment period δ.
Let K(p) ≡ K(p, ρ, r, δ) be the present value of the debt repayment which includes
all accrued interests.3 We assume the following:
Assumption 1. For any p, p ≥ K(p): Financing tuition with a loan is more at-
tractive than paying tuition upfront. This happens if, for example, students discount
future earnings at a higher rate than the loan interest rate r.
Assumption 2. For any p ∈ [p∗, I], K(p) < p∗. The net present value of the loan
repayment is smaller than equilibrium tuition without loans.
Assumption 3. F (p∗) > 1
2
.
Students’ decisions problem is now different and will depend on whether they
are eligible for loans or not. Eligible students choose Ci to maximize:
Ui, i ∈ E =

V (ai)−K(p) if Ci = 1
0 if Ci = 0
(2.9)
Let aL be the ability level that solves Equation 2.10.
V (aL)−K(p) = 0 (2.10)
2I could have chosen different eligibility thresholds. However, it does not change the main
implications of the model.
3If a student has an accumulated debt of L(p) at the end of her studies and the loan installment





Notice that if Assumption 2 holds, aL(p) ≤ a∗. Then, the ability eligibility
criteria binds, that is there is a mass of low-income students with ability below a∗
that would like to take the loan but are prevented from it. Thus, all low-income
students with a ≥ a∗ will take the loan and go to college.
On the other, hand ineligible students choose Ci to maximize:
Ui, i ∈ Ec =

V (ai)− p if Ci = 1
0 if Ci = 0
(2.11)
Similarly, let aN be the ability level that satisfies V (aN) − p = 0. Ineligible
students will only attend college if V (aN)− p ≥ 0. Notice that for any p, aN > aL.
Therefore, under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the demand for college C, DL(p) is












Therefore, C chooses the optimal tuition level, pL, that maximizes πL(p) =






2.2.4 Implications on Student Welfare
The effect of the loan program on student welfare is heterogeneous.4 The
loan program increases the demand for education of low-income student with high-
ability. All eligible students go to college when the loan is available. However, this
increase in demand pushes sticker price up, which affects high-income students in
the margin. In fact, high income students with ability a ∈ [a∗, aN ] decide not to
enroll college now that the price is higher. The net effect on demand depends on
the magnitude of these two effects. Assumption 3 states a sufficient condition in
order for the latter effect to be dominated by the former, so that that the net effect
in demand is positive.
High-income students with ability a ≥ aN still find profitable to go to college,
but they pay a higher tuition now, which reduces their surplus.
Therefore, the overall effect of loans is that they push sticker price up, and
allows eligible students to go to college. Now, we conduct a simple comparative
statics analysis and compare the change in student welfare after the implementation
of the loan program.
4If universities invest some of their profits, it is possible that the quality of education also
increases. The definition of welfare in my model does not take into account this effect. Thus, it
can be interpreted as a short-run or direct effect on student welfare.
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Equation (2.14) shows the overall change in student welfare, ∆Ws:





− (1− F (p∗))(1−G(aN))(pL − p∗)
− (1− F (p∗))
∫ aN
a∗
(V (x)− p∗)) g(x)dx
(2.14)
The first term in (2.14) corresponds to the increase in utility for eligible stu-
dents, which raises from 0 (without loans they do not go to college) to V (ai)−K(pL)
(lower solid area in Figure 2.2). The utility of high-income students with ability
a ≥ aN , decreases by pL − p∗ due to the price increase (upper solid area in Figure
2.1). The second term in (2.14) shows to the overall change in utility for students
in this group. Finally, high-income students with ability a < aN are driven-out of
the market and cannot afford to go to college (see dashed area in Figure 2.2). Their
utility decreases from V (a)−p∗ to 0. It is worth mention that loans have no impact
on ineligible students with ability a < a∗, since they do not attend college in either
scenario.
The model shows that a loan program that targets low-income and high abil-
ity students, like the one presented in this section, has an undetermined effect on
total student welfare. It increases enrollment among the target population, but it
also drives sticker price up, which hurts ineligible students. The main underlying
assumption is that colleges can exert some market power through pricing, which is
taken from granted if the college is a monopolist. The introduction of competition,
for example through more and potentially differentiated colleges, should reduce this
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium with Loans
price effect, and reduce the losses through that channel.
2.3 Econometric Model
2.3.1 Demand Side
I model the choice of a degree (or academic program) using a random coef-
ficients multinomial logit framework in the spirit of McFadden (1974) and Berry
et al.(1995). The indirect utility of choosing a certain program depends on ob-
served and unobserved characteristics, as well as on individual-specific factors. In a
particular year, students are faced with a number of programs they can apply to.
Let It be the set of applicants and Jt the set of options in market t, where
each market is a different academic year.
The indirect utility of student i from choosing program j in market t is modeled
as a function of observed and unobserved program characteristics, denoted by xjt
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and ψjt, respectively, and the tuition charged by program j in market t, pjt, as
shown in (2.15).
uijt = pjtαi + xjtβi + ψjt + εijt (2.15)
i = 1...It, j = 1...Jt, t = 1...T.
The coefficient αi is student i’s marginal disutility from tuition (price), and







+ ΠDi + Σvi (2.16)
, where Di ∼ P̂D(D) is a vector of known student characteristics, Π is a vector
of coefficients indicating how tastes vary with student characteristics (D), Σ a vector
of parameters, and finally vi ∼ P̂ ∗v(v) is a normally distributed error term.
The most common empirical challenge when estimating (2.15) is that tuition,
pjt is likely correlated with unobserved program characteristics, ψjt, which would
bias the estimate for αi. This correlation arises because colleges know ψjt and take
it into account when setting prices, pjt. To overcome this identification issue, I
follow Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) (henceforth BLP), which provides us
with a method to instrument for the endogeneity of pjt in this random-coefficient
logit framework.
The BLP method has at least two advantages over traditional discrete choice
models. First, and more importantly, it allows to correct for the endogeneity of
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tuition. BLP constructs a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator us-
ing a proper set of exogenous instruments for pjt,5 and a contraction mapping that
allows to find the unknown coefficients in (2.15) and (2.16) numerically (see Nevo,
2000). Second, the random coefficients allows to estimate richer and more realis-
tic substitution patterns among alternatives. Under a standard logit model, the
price elasticities of demand are proportional to market shares, and predicts a higher
markup for low-priced programs, which can only happen if low-priced programs have
proportionally lower marginal costs than more expensive programs. This arises be-
cause the standard logit model exhibits the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
property (IIA), which restricts the substitution pattern among alternatives. In the
BLP model, in contrast, and by letting sjt be the market share of program j in mar-
ket t, own and cross price-demand elasticities (ηjjt, ηjkt, respectively) are determined















,where sijt is the estimated probability of individual i choosing program j in
market t.
5I use as instruments the sum of the observed product characteristics of other programs offered




I combine the demand model specified in (2.15) and (2.16) with a model of
optimal college pricing. I assume that in each period universities set the tuition for
each of the programs they offer to maximize profits.
Specifically, suppose that university f , f = 1...F , offers a subset Sft of the
j = 1...Jt available programs in period t.




(pjt − cjt)Mtsjt(pt)− Cft (2.19)
, where cj is the marginal cost of enrolling a student in program j, Mt is the
size of the market t. sjt(pt) is the market share of program j, which depends on the
vector of tuition in market t, pt. Finally, Cjt is a fixed cost.
We assume that a pure-strategy Bertand-Nash equilibrium is reached in each
period. Therefore, each university sets the tuition of the programs it offers taking
the tuition of programs offered by other universities as given. The set of First Order
Conditions (FOCs) that satisfy the Bertand-Nash equilibrium and characterize the








∀j ∈ Sf , t = 1...T
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The FOC in (2.20) can be written in matrix form as follows:
st = Ωt(pt − ct) (2.21)
The matrix Ω(pt), which defines the set programs that are offered by different





, if ∃f : {r, j} ⊂ Sf
0, otherwise
(2.22)
Since market shares and prices are observed, and Ω(pt) can be derived from(2.17)
and (2.18), we use (2.21) to recover the vector of marginal costs in each period
(Equation 2.23).
ĉt = pt − Ω−1t st (2.23)
2.3.3 Counterfactual
Let t = 0 be the period before the loan program was implemented, and t = 1
the period after. I conjecture that eligible students will be less price-sensitive in
t = 1, which should imply, on average, lower price elasticities of demand. That
is, ηjj0 > ηjj1, for most j. The main objective is to estimate the tuition that
universities would have set in the absence of loans in t = 1 (counterfactual). I
can use the estimated marginal cost in t = 1, ĉ1, to find the tuition vector that is
consistent with the FOC in (2.20) if the demand were as inelastic as in a period
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without loans. Therefore, I use the estimated elasticities in t = 0 (pre-loan) to build
counterfactual prices in t = 1 that are consistent with current market shares and
universities’ cost structure.
p̂1 = ĉ1 − Ω−10 s1 (2.24)
Finally, counterfactual tuition fees are used to estimate the externality of loans
on ineligible students. Specifically, the difference between actual and counterfactual
tuition can be interpreted as the externality that arises once loans become available.
2.4 Data and Sample
2.4.1 Institutional Background
The Chilean tertiary education system has experienced significant changes dur-
ing the last 30 years. Until 1981, the higher education system was composed by only
eight universities, two of which were public, and most of them offered only four and
five-year degrees. Higher education was tuition-free and it was primarily financed
by direct subsidies from the federal government to the institutions. Historically,
gross enrollment rates did not surpassed 10-15% and the system was predominantly
for the elites,6 and students from the richest families, who generally outperformed
those from most disadvantaged ones in admission tests, filled most of the vacancies.
6The gross enrollment rate in tertiary education is defined by UNESCO as the "total enrollment
in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total
population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving".
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A major reform in 1981 established a new higher education framework. With
the purpose of increasing competition, it introduced substantial market-based changes
that last until these days. First, the reform encouraged the entry of new private
participants. Thus, between 1981 and 1990, 40 privates universities were created.
Second, two new types of private higher education institutions (hereafte HEIs) were
introduced: Technical Training Centers (TTC or Centros de Formacion Técnica)
and Professional Institutes (PI or Institutos Profesionales). TTCs generally offer
two to three-year technical and vocacational degrees and IPs generally offer four-year
professional degrees. Third, the two public universities were divided into multiple
regional institutions. These new universities and the pre-reform private universities
formed a consortsium called CRUCH (Consejo de Rectores de las Universidades
Chilenas) to differentiate themselves from the newly formed private universities
(hereafter, non-CRUCH). The main structure of the higher education system has
remained almost unchanged ever since.
Under this new configuration, HEIs were relatively free to expand and offer a
variety of new degrees, expanding significantly the supply of higher education. The
number of HEIs peaked 303 in 1991 and has steadily declined to a total of 147 in
2015 (see Figure 2.3). Gross enrollment rate has increased to 74% (in 2014) and the
number of students in the higher education system has increased more than 6-fold
(see Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.3: Number of Institutions
Note: Author’s Calculation. Source: CNED.
2.4.2 Higher Education Financing
The main source of funding for all HEIs, is student fees. In fact, according
to (OECD, 2014), the share of private expenditure in higher education is 76% and
the rest is financed by the State. The State funds the system through three main
channels. First, it provides direct subsidies to the 25 CRUCH universities (called
AFD or Aporte Fiscal Directo).7 These funds are non-competitively allocated. They
are in relation to historical market shares and have not changed much in 30 years.
Second, the State provides a one time, per-student transfer to HEIs for enrolling
top-scoring students in the college admissions test (PSU). This subsidy is called AFI
7Non-CRUCH universities, TTCs and IPs do not receive AFD.
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Figure 2.4: Enrollment
Note: Author’s Calculation. Source: CNED.
o Aporte Fiscal Indirecto.8 Although all HEI are eligible for AFI, according to the
Ministry of Education of Chile, 87.6% is assigned to CRUCH universities, 12.1%
to non-CRUCH universities and less than 1% to IPs and CFTs. Third, the State
offers a loan at a 2% subsidized rate to students in CRUCH institutions (FSCU or
Fondo Solidario de Crédito Universitario). Loans are re-payed contingent on income
during a fixed number of years. Students in institutions outside the CRUCH are nor
eligible for the FSCU. Hence, it has historically served less that 10% of the student
population. Finally, the State offers scholarships to capable student with financial
needs.
8The amount of the subsidy is set by tranches of PSU. The amount of the per-student subsidy
in the top tranche is 40% of the average tuition in Chile.
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2.4.3 State-Guaranteed Loan Program
The Chilean higher education system made great progress during the 90s,
allowing thousands of students to pursue a postsecondary degree. However, access
was still highly unequal. On one hand, students from disadvantaged backgrounds
faced adverse borrowing conditions. As in any human capital accumulation problem,
the lack of collateral makes it almost impossible for a needy student from a poor
background to obtain a loan in standard financial markets. On the other hand, the
combination of relatively high tuition fees (see OECD, 2014; Solis, 2016) and the
pressing need to generate income, forced students from poorer backgrounds to enter
the labor market instead of pursuing a college degree.
In an effort to promote a more equal access to higher education, and to support
qualified students from disadvantaged backgrounds in financing their postsecondary
studies, the State launched a massive loan program in 2006. The so called State-
Guaranteed Loan (SCL) or CAE for its Spanish initials9 is a standard mortgage-type
student loan issued by private financial institutions but guaranteed by the State.
The CAE is administered by a special commission named Ingresa.
The SGL does not require families to provide a collateral to secure the debt.
HEIs guarantee a fraction of the debt until the students graduation, and the rest
is guaranteed by the State. The State, in fact, guarantees 90% of the debt after
graduation. The remaining 10% of the debt is no guaranteed, and banks bear that
risk.
9Crédito con Garantia Estatal.
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The SGL requires students and HEIs to meet certain eligibility criteria. First,
students must provide proof of financial need. After filling an application form
containing information on family income and socio-economic conditions, the Ingresa
commission determines whether a student qualifies for the SGL or not. In addition
to this, students must meet minimum academic merit, which is set at 475 average
points on the college admissions test (PSU), which corresponds to 25% of SD below
the national average. Students who do not take the PSU must have graduated from
high school with a minimum GPA of 5.27 (in a 1 to 7 scale).
As opposed to FSCU, any HEI can participate in the SGL. The only require-
ments are that they must be accredited and that must agree to the terms regarding
the guarantee of the loans before students graduate. As of 2015, 96 HEIs participate
in the loan program.
Loans’ real interest rate remained stable around 5.5% during the period 2006-
2012. Then, a reform in 2012 fixed the rate at 2%. Loans can only finance tuition
fees. Stipends and other expenses cannot be covered by the SGL. The amount of the
loan is capped at a “reference tuition” set by the Ministry of Education. The annual
reference tuition is calculated based on sticker price but also weights some quality
indicators such as student-faculty ratios, drop-out rates, among others. References
tuition is on average 90% of the sticker price. The difference between sticker price
and reference tuition (if any) has to be financed by students by other means.
Students’ debt begins to accrue interest immediately, but students have no
financial obligations while they remain studying. The loan is repaid on a monthly
basis after graduation, and the repayment period can be 10, 15, or 20 years depend-
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ing on the type of degree and the amount of the loan. Payments can be suspended in
case of unemployment or if installments surpass 50% of graduates’ monthly income.
All unpaid debt is borne by the State. Finally, the bank that owns the debt can call
the State guarantee if students stop paying for more than three consecutive months
and after some collection effort has been demonstrated.
2.4.4 Data
I employ four different databases in this study. First, I use application data
to CRUCH universities in 2005 and 2007. The former year is one in which the SGL
was still not implemented, while 2007 is the second year of operation of the SGL.
Universities in CRUCH run a centralized admission process, in which students rank
the academic programs they are applying to. Specifically, students submit an or-
dered list containing up to 8 options to a clearinghouse. Students do not apply to
universities but rather to specific programs within universities. Therefore, an option
is defined as a university-major pair (henceforth, a program). For example, “En-
gineering at University A” or “Political Science at University B ”. Once preferences
are collected, a clearinghouse runs a student-proposed Deferred-Acceptance algo-
rithm (or Gale-Shapley) that assign students to programs according to their score,
preferences and the number of seats available.10 My dataset contains student-level
application to universities in CRUCH and I observe the ranking list submitted to
the clearinghouse by each student.
Second, I use individual records from the college admission test (PSU) in
10See Espinoza et al. (2017) for further details on the Chilean admission system.
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years 2005 and 2007. The data contains information of the scores in each PSU
subject. This dataset also includes a rich characterization of students, including
demographic information such as gender, age, the high school from which they
graduated, and high school GPA. It also includes a rich description of students’
socio-economics status, including variables and such as family income, family size,
parental education, among others.
The third dataset contains administrative records from the Higher Education
Information System (SIES) which is the governmental body within the Ministry
of Education that manages and discloses official tertiary education statistics. This
student-level data tracks students over time, and indicates which programs students
are enrolled in each academic year. This dataset and covers the period 2005-2013.
Finally, I use a dataset from the Chilean National Education Council (CNED)
containing supply-side information. Specifically, the dataset contains administra-
tive information on the programs that are offered by all HEIs in Chile. From this
database I extract information on the characteristics of the programs, including
tuition (sticker price), duration of the program and geographical location. This
dataset also contains information on the characteristics of HEIs, such as such as to-
tal enrollment, number of campuses, and accreditation status. This dataset covers
the period 2005-2013.
Table 2.1 shows some descriptive statistics of the application dataset. The
sample includes 157,436 students who applied to universities in CRUCH through
the centralized matching system. Panel A shows that students are on average 19.5
years old and roughly 50% are woman.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Year 2005 Year 2007
(Pre-Loan) (Post-Loan)
Panel A. Demand Side
Number of Applicants 72,995 84,441
Age 19.52 19.51
(std.) (1.95) (1.94)
Female (%) 49.92 51.16
Public Schools (%) 19.75 17.18
Voucher Schools (%) 42.49 46.21
Private School (%) 37.44 36.23
From Santiago (%) 33.65 34.00
N. of options listed 5.22 5.01
Use all option (%) 23.45 20.39
Panel B. Supply Side
# of universities 25 25
# of programs offered 869 951
Programs in Santiago (%) 33.80 34.09
Tuition (2007 USD) 3,572.20 3,847.68
(std.) (1,176.68) (1,219.95)
Standard deviation of selected variables are shown in parenthesis.
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Although students from privates schools (richer students) represent only 10%
of total high school enrollment, they represent more that 36% of my sample. This
means that students from high socio-economic status are over represented in the
higher education system. In terms of application behavior, although they can list
up to 8 options the average number of applications is 5.22, and only one out of five
students uses the maximum number of options to list. Panel B in Table 2.1 show
descriptive statistics of the supply side. The average tuition rose by 7.7% in the two
years window. The number of programs offered varies a slightly from one year to
the other (869 in 2005 and 951 in 2007), and roughly one third of the programs are
located in the largest metropolitan area in Chile (Santiago).
In 2007, the SGL was awarded to 24,240 first-year students in all higher ed-
ucation institutions and to 1,574 first-year students in CRUCH universities, cor-
responding to 2.5% of students who are offered admission through the centralized
matching system.
2.4.5 Pricing Behavior
In my main analysis, I use applications to CRUCH universities to estimate
price-demand elasticities for different programs, which are used to estimate coun-
terfactual pricing scenarios. However, CRUCH universities are not a representative
sample of Chilean higher education institutions. First, CRUCH universities are the
oldest universities in Chile. All 25 universities in CRUCH were created before 1981,
and have a long history and prestige (comparable to Ivy League colleges in the U.S).
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CRUCH gathers all state-owned universities (16) as well as 9 private universi-
ties. Also, they only offer 4 to 5-years degrees (no technical or vocational degrees).
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for each type of institutions. CRUCH univer-
sities are comparable to universities outside the CRUCH (non-CRUCH) in several
dimensions, including average tuition and student composition. However, they dif-
fer in the average years of accreditation and on the PSU score of the students they
enroll. However, CRUCH universities are not comparable in most dimensions to
institutions offering 2 and 4-year degrees (TTCs and PIs). For example, tuition fees
at those institutions are considerably lower. Students at TTCs or PIs enroll students
with lower PSU scores and a vast majority come from either public or voucher high
schools.
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Table 2.2: Types of HEIs
TTC PI non-CRUCH Univ. CRUCH Univ.
(2yr-degrees) (4yr-degrees) (5yr-degrees) (5yr degrees)
PANEL A. Supply Side
# of HEIs 56 40 33 25
# of Field 191 141 228 206
Average tuition (USD) $ 2,602 $ 2,694 $ 5,401 $ 5,345
# of campuses 167 178 148 71
Years of accreditation (Avg.) 1.24 1.68 2.20 4.80
PANEL B. Demand Side
# of students 62,282 111,240 88,087 64,751
% of total enrollment (market share) 19.1% 34.1% 27.0% 19.8%
% female 52% 51% 52% 47%
Average PSU score 406.55 412.06 487 560
Student Composition
% Public Schools 45% 41% 27% 30%
% Voucher Schools 53% 56% 56% 55%
% Private Schools 2% 3% 16% 16%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: CNED, 2014
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In this section, I analyze the evolution of tuition in the overall Chilean higher
education system and provide reduced-form evidence of whether the SGL may have
caused HEIs to raise tuition. Since eligible HEIs decided whether or not to joing
the SGL, I hypothesize that colleges that joined the SGL raised tuition more than
colleges that didn’t join.
Tuition fees charged by HEIs have been steadily rising during the last decade,
averaging a 4.5% annual increase over the period 2005-2015. In this section I study
to what extent the implementation of the SGL program might have contributed to
this phenomena. It is worth noting that Chile has one of the most expensive higher
education systems among OECD countries. Total expenditure per student per year
reaches roughly 50% of GDP per capita (OECD, 2014) and can be compared to the
US and Korea in this dimension. Moreover, roughly two thirds of total expenditure
is paid by students and their families with limited contribution from the State.
Students loans for attending higher education can trigger a tuition increase.
Loans targeting students who face short-run liquidity constraints increase the de-
mand for higher education, since now more individuals can now afford to pay the
cost of attending college. It also can make students less price-sensitive. Colleges
can respond by raising tuition, provided they exert some degree of market power.
I aggregate academic programs by field and institution. For each observation,
I calculate the percentage tuition increase during the period 2005-2010.11 Table 2.3
shows the average, minimum and maximum tuition increase during the 5-year span
for programs in institutions that joined the SGL versus programs in institutions
11The sample is restricted to group of programs that were offered in both periods.
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that did not the SGL.
Table 2.3: Change in Tuition 2005-2010 by Type of HEI
Not in SGL In SGL Diff p-value
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
TTC 0.248 0.383 13.5% 0.0002
[-0.076,0.79] [-0.05,0.744]
PI 0.193 0.279 8.6% 0.0449
[-0.191,0.691] [-0.103,1.153]
University 0.244 0.379 13.5% 0.00
[-0.399,1.216] [-0.209,1.828]
All 0.237 0.365 12.8% 0.00
[-0.399,1.216] [-0.209,1.828]
Programs in institutions that joined the SGL increased tuition 12.8% more
than in institutions that did not joined it (36.5% versus 23.7% on average). Most
differences are statistically different at the 5% level.
Universities increased tuition up to 180% in five years (minimum and max-
imum per type of HEI are shown in brackets). Tuition in TTCs and PIs that
joined the SGL also increased between 2005 and 2010, although there is observe less
variability than in universities. Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 show similar statistics by
field of study for TTC, PIs an universities, respectively. They report report large
heterogeneity across field and type of HEI.
To formally test the hypothesis that the SGL programs raised tuition, I per-
form a simple regression analysis based on a difference in differences approach.
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Table 2.4: Average Tuition Change by Field of Study: Technical Training Centers
(x 100 %)
Field of Study In SGL Not in SGL Difference p-value
Business & Administration 0.26 0.42 0.15 0.06
Agriculture 0.32 0.42 0.10 0.67
Arts & Architecture 0.19 0.33 0.14 0.21
Sciences
Social Sciences 0.35 0.72 0.38
Law 0.16 0.27 0.11 0.14
Education 0.25 0.32 0.06 0.45
Humanities
Health 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.09
Technology 0.28 0.38 0.11 0.30
Table 2.5: Average Tuition Change by Field of Study: Professional Institutes (x 100
%)
Field ofs Study In SGL Not in SGL Difference p-value
Business & Administration 0.19 0.28 0.09 0.42
Agriculture 0.28 0.24 -0.04
Arts & Architecture 0.04 0.33 0.29 0.04
Sciences
Social Sciences 0.16 0.28 0.12 0.47
Law 0.69 0.11 -0.58
Education 0.26 0.24 -0.02 0.83
Humanities
Health
Technology 0.09 0.35 0.26 0.11
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Table 2.6: Average Tuition Change by Field of Study: Universities (x 100 %)
Field of Study In SGL Not in SGL Difference p-value
Business & Administration 0.19 0.41 0.22 0.06
Agriculture 0.17 0.39 0.21 0.04
Arts & Architecture 0.47 0.37 -0.10 0.24
Sciences 0.49 0.37 -0.13
Social Sciences 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.04
Law 0.46 0.43 -0.03 0.85
Education 0.23 0.34 0.11 0.09
Humanities 0.04 0.34 0.30 0.02
Health 0.12 0.36 0.24 0.02
Technology 0.11 0.36 0.25 0.06
Specifically, I estimate the following regression model:
log pijt = α + βpostt + γJoinedj + δ(postt × Joinedj) + ωXijt + εijt (2.25)
Where pijt is the tuition charged by program i in institution j in year t. We
define the binary variable postt taking the value 1 in years after the institution
joined the SGL and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dichotomous variable Jj indicates
whether institution j joined the SGL or not. Xijt is a set of controls including
time and institution fixed effect, and εijt is an idiosyncratic error term. The pa-
rameter of interest is δ, which captures the effect of the SGL on the log of tuition
at institutions that joined the SGL. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.7 shows that
after the SGL, participating institutions raised tuition 4 to 5% compared to non-
participating institutions. Columns (3)-(8) shows differential effects across different
types of institutions.
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Table 2.7: Difference-in-Difference regression Results: Tuition Increase
All All TTC TTC IP IP Univ. Univ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post x Joinedjt 0.046** 0.041** 0.067** 0.070*** 0.052 0.030 0.033 0.030
(0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.025) (0.046) (0.039) (0.029) (0.028)
Year Fixed-Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HEI Fixed-Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Field Fixed-Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
R2 0.93 0.97 0.88 0.93 0.83 0.93 0.79 0.92
N 4284 4284 1059 1059 643 643 2582 2582
Note: The unit of observation is program by year. Regression models additionally include university fixed effects and year fixed




The estimation of the BLP random coefficients logit model requires that mar-
ket level-data, including prices and market shares. We define a market as a given
academic year. I use data from the application processes 2005 and 2007. The former
is a pre-loan period and the latter is one when the loan systems was already in place.
It is important to mention that all universities in CRUCH participated in the loan
program in 2007.
Since students rank individual programs, I use the top-ranked option for each
student to calculate program market shares. For instance, if all students rank a pro-
gram as their top-choice, its market share would be 100%, independent on whether
they were finally admitted. In fact, market shares calculated using stated preferences
differ from post-selection market shares because seats are limited, and therefore a
fraction of the applicants are not accepted in their most preferred option. In this
context, data on applications allows me to estimate demand elasticities abstracting
from the fact that final enrollment reflects not only preferences but also program
capacities. For instance, if there exists a program that is highly demanded but with
very few seats, the number of applications will exceed the number of students actu-
ally enrolled, and if market shares were calculated using actual enrollment we would
be underestimating its true demand.
The estimation also requires to calculate the market share of an “outside good”,
which is used as numeraire. In each period, its market share is calculated as the
percentage of students who decide not to apply to a program in the CRUCH. Market
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shares of the outside good in 2005 and 2007 are 57% and 60.3%, respectively.
The BLP method constructs a GMM estimator using a proper set of exogenous
instruments for pjt. Unfortunately, is difficult to find variables that shift the costs
and are uncorrelated with the demand shock. Instead, I follow Bresnahan (1981)
and Bresnahan (1987), to define the set of instruments, which have been extensively
used in the literature. I assume that the characteristics of programs is exogenous or
determined before students make decisions about which program to apply to. I use
the sum of the observed product characteristics of other programs offered by the
same university and the sum of observed characteristics of programs in the same
field offered by other universities as instruments. One of the main advantage of
these instruments is that they vary program by program.
2.5 Results
Table 2.8 shows the results of the demand model from 15 and 16. The model
in column (2) allows the coefficient α to depend on student demographic character-
istics, while the model in column (1) does not. The table shows the means of the
distribution of marginal utility on tuition (α) as well as for other covariates. Univer-
sity fixed-effects are also included. As expected, the coefficient on tuition is negative,
which implies a disutility of higher tuition fees, conditional on program character-
istics (observed and unobserved). My preferred specification (column 2) allows the
coefficients to depend on student observed characteristics. I include whether or not
the student is eligible for the loan, and dummy variables indicating the type of high
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Table 2.8: Demand Estimation








HEI Dummies YES YES
N 704 704
school students graduated from (private, public of voucher), which proxies student
socioeconomic status.12
These estimates are used to calculate own and cross-price elasticities of demand
in both periods (before and after loans) using equations (2.17) and (2.18). Table
2.9 shows descriptive statistics of the elasticities in both periods for programs in
different fields of study. The average own price-demand elasticity is -4.08 in my
sample, although some heterogeneity emerges across programs in different fields.
For example, programs in the fields of education and humanities exhibit a relatively
high price-demand elasticity. In contrast, programs in the health or law sector
exhibit substantially lower elasticities. 13 However, it is important to note that the
12A standard robustness check for these types of models is to check how well they predict
students’ second choices. The correlation between the predicted market of share of students’
second choices and market shares that can be calculated using the application data is 0.6.
13To the best of my knowledge, the literature has not reported elasticities to which I can compare
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Elasticities
random-coefficients model used does not restrict these elasticities to fully depends on
markets shares, such as in a standard logit framework. On the contrary, differences
in elasticities are mainly driven by changes in the underlying demand for different
program, and by the price sensitivity of students.
More importantly, the average elasticity is lower in the period with loans
than in the period without loans (average of -4.36 versus -3.80, respectively). This
suggests, as expected, the loans made students less sensitive to tuition. Figure 2.5
shows the overall distribution of elasticities in years 2005 and 2007. Similarly, Table
2.9 shows the same results stratified by field of study.
We use the estimated elasticities shown in Figure 2.5 to estimate the marginal
costs that are consistent with pricing strategies in 2007. Specifically, I back up the
marginal costs using equation (2.23). I find that the average markup of price over
marginal cost went up from 22.52% in 2005 to 30.06% in 2007. Table 2.10 shows
my results. Furthermore, the comparison would not be trivial due to idiosyncratic factors
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Elasticities by Field
Table 2.9: Average Elasticities by Field




Arts & Architecture -4.12 -3.19
Sciences -4.53 -4.02








markup heterogeneity across different fields in the pre and post-loan period.
Table 2.10: Markups




Arts & Architecture 0.29 0.38
Sciences 0.27 0.45







I use Equation (2.24) to simulate the pricing strategy in the post-loan period.
I use the estimated elasticities in the pre-loan period to simulate prices that are
consistent with the post-period structure. This allows me to find counterfactual
prices in the post-loan period under the assumption that the distribution of price
elasticities of demand equals that of the pre-loan period.
I find that the median program sets a tuition 5.9% higher than would have
set without loans. Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of actual and simulated prices
in 2007. Since the demand is more inelastic in the post-loan period, universities
raised tuition after the loan program. The dotted line in Figure 2.7 shows the
counterfactual distribution of tuition fees, i.e. those that universities would have set
in 2007 if loans were never been implemented. Table 2.11 shows average actual and
simulated prices stratified by field of study. The average difference between actual
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Figure 2.7: Actual and Simulated Tuition
tuition and its counterfactual is $174 USD.
I use the simulated and actual prices to estimate the burden imposed by loans
on ineligible students. Using the estimates from Table 2.11, I found that the average
ineligible student paid US$178 per year more than he would have paid in a year
without loans. Figure 2.8 shows the tuition differential for students with different
PSU scores. We observe that the tuition differential is higher for students with
higher scores.
The sum of this price differences over all ineligible students yields a total of
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Table 2.11: Actual vs. Simulated Tuition (2007)
Actual Tuition Simulated Tuition
Administration $ 3,553 $ 3,464
Agriculture $ 3,888 $ 3,694
Arts & Architecture $ 3,709 $ 3,481
Sciences $ 3,645 $ 3,482
Social Sciences $ 3,507 $ 3,341
Law $ 4,094 $ 3,651
Education $ 2,608 $ 2,535
Humanities $ 3,126 $ 3,007
Health $ 4,235 $ 3,984
Technology $ 3,580 $ 3,366
Total $ 3,468 $ 3,294
Figure 2.8: Actual and Simulated Tuition by PSU score
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$9.93 million per year or $47.6 million over the duration of the studies 14. This
amount can be interpreted as the externality that is imposed on ineligible students.
In 2007, a total of 1543 loans were granted to first-year students in CRUCH, for
a total amount of $2.85 million. Therefore, for every federal dollar spent in loans
ineligible students end up paying roughly 3.5 dollars more.
My empirical model assumes that institutions maximize profits when setting
their optimal tuition. However, universities in Chile are not allowed to be for-profit
(although IPs and TTCs are). Nevertheless, there could be several reasons to believe
that the profit-maximization assumption can be valid in the Chilean setting. For
example, the fact that universities are non for-profit institutions does not mean
that they do not maximize the difference between revenues and cost. In a context
of competition for quality or reputation, it may be optimal to maximize profits
so that these can be reinvested, for example by building new campuses, libraries,
laboratories or hiring more faculty. To test this, I use use data from publicly reported
profits and expenditures15 to test whether profits are correlated with investments
that could lead to higher quality. Table 2.12 reports the results of simple regressions
attempting to test such correlations. The explanatory variable is annual profits. The
independent variables are changes between the year the profits were made and the
year after it. In Columns 1 and 2, I use the change in salary expenditure (faculty
and staff, respectively). For Column 3, I use the change in the number of full-time
faculty. Finally, for columns 4 and 5, I use the change in the number of buildings
14The average program duration in my sample is 4.8 years
15Source: SIES, Ministry of Education of Chile
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and total classroom area (squared meters). The sample includes all universities
(private and public) in the period 2013-2015. The coefficients in columns 1-3 show a
positive correlation between university profits in year t and changes between year t
and t+1 of total faculty and staff salary and total faculty. However, the results show
no effects of profits on short-run investments in infrastructure (columns 4 and 5).
Table 2.12 shows evidence that universities’ profits are correlated with expenditure
in items that may be positively related with education quality (e.g. more and better
faculty).
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Table 2.12: Profits and Investment
Annual Change
Total Faculty Total Staff Full Time Number of Classroom
Salary Salary Faculty (x1000) Buildings (x1000) Surface(x1000 m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Profits 0.260*** 0.232*** 0.003** -0.000 0.016
(0.039) (0.044) (0.001) (0.000) (0.062)
R2 0.31 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.03
N 116 116 100 98 98
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Public Dummy YES YES YES YES YES
Data Source: SIES, Ministry of Education of Chile.
Note: Sample include all universities in the period 2013-2015.
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2.6 Conclusion
The ability of financial aid policies to increase student welfare depends on
colleges’ pricing reaction. While most of the literature has focused on the benefit of
financial aid on eligible students, my paper focuses on the estimation of the negative
spillover on ineligible students that arises when colleges strategically raise tuition to
capture some portion of the student aid.
Using data on a Chilean state-guaranteed loan program, I find that non-eligible
students pay 5.9% higher tuition than they would have paid in the absence of loans.
The size of the externality imposed on non-eligible students in my sample is esti-
mated at $218 USD per student per year for a total of $9.93 million per year.
The literature shows that loans can significantly increase college enrollment,
especially among disadvantaged students. In most cases, a college degree translates
into better labor market outcomes. Thus, loans have the potential to increase the
welfare of its beneficiaries and in cases when college attendance fully depends on
the loan, gains can be substantial. In that sense, proper estimates of the return to
education for different college degrees (see (Hastings et al., 2013b; Rau et al., 2013;
Espinoza and Urzúa, 2016)) can shed light of the overall welfare effect of the SGL.
The escalating tuition level is a worldwide trend that compromises the capacity
of expanding higher education to most vulnerable students and the weakens the role
of higher education as a source of social mobility.
My findings highlight one unintended consequence of student loans for college
that is usually ignored and that partially offsets the gains that can be achieved by
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student loans. In that sense, my results could be of particular interest to policy-
makers, who should take this into account when designing and implementing such
policies.
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Chapter 3: Endogenous Market Formation: Theory and Evidence from
Chilean College Admissions
Note: This chapter is coauthored with Soohyung Lee and Héctor López.
3.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, lessons from market design have been actively
adopted in organizing real-world markets, including goods auctions, labor markets,
and organ allocation. Student-school matching markets have shown perhaps the
most dramatic changes due to market design. Starting with New York City’s pub-
lic school assignment, numerous cities across America and around the world have
adopted market-design inspired centralized assignment schemes in assigning children
to public schools.1 The benefits of adopting such centralized assignment schemes
are well recognized among researchers and practitioners: these schemes produce ef-
ficient and fair assignment of students, a feature enjoyed by school officials, families
1More than 15 cities across America use (or are in the process of adopting) a version of the
deferred acceptance algorithm. The theoretical challenges of these implementations are well docu-
mented in several papers, for example: Abdulkadiroğlu and Sonmez (2003); Abdulkadiroğlu et al.
(2005a,b, 2015); Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011).
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and schools alike. However, such transitions to centralized assignment schemes have
been the product of policy intervention by local authorities and not the initiative
of market participants. Furthermore, a sizable number of schools, such as charter
or private schools in the US, have decided not to participate in these centralized
assignment schemes.
The necessity of policy intervention is well grounded in theory, as formation
of a centralized market faces two challenges. First, some participants might prefer
an inefficient market institution in which they can exploit a market failure. Second,
others might be better off exploiting their market power after the centralized market
has been formed. These two problems are accentuated in markets in which the gains
from moving to an efficient market structure cannot be freely distributed among
participants.2
Despite the challenges, there is evidence that some centralized markets are
organized and maintained by market participants.3 Thus, studying the conditions
under which such formation is possible is of major importance. This paper makes
progress in this direction by presenting a theoretical setting in which agents volun-
tarily adopt a transition to a centralized market and supporting empirical evidence.
2Starting with Roth’s contributions (Roth, 1982, 1984a; Roth and Xing, 1994), it has been
recognized that forming and staying in a centralized stable clearing house might or might not be
a Nash equilibrium. In particular, agents with multiunit demand might find it profitable not to
participate and to transact earlier or later (see Ekmekci and Yenmez, 2016) than the centralized
market.
3The most famous examples are markets for new physicians in the United States and the United
Kingdom, as documented by Roth and Xing (1994); Roth (1984b, 1991); Roth and Peranson (1999).
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In our setting, the key mechanism facilitating the transition is the close com-
petition among agents and moderate level of costs in the process of matching. This
mechanism can explain the voluntary adoption and maintenance of a centralized
market and its expansion when new participants enter into the market. The intu-
ition is straightforward. Consider a simple case of student-school matching in which
there are only two schools. When two market participants are similar, the ineffi-
ciencies created by decentralization are equally distributed between the two; thus,
the two participants equally enjoy the gains of centralization by expanding the pool
of applicants and reducing the number of vacant seats. We investigate this market
force and its consequences in the context of college admissions in Chile.
The Chilean college admission process has experienced a transition to a (more)
centralized system twice since 1960. The first episode of centralization occurred
when all non-technical colleges, a total of 8 at that time, adopted a centralized
admission system based on the Gale-Shapley mechanism. These colleges branched
out into 25 colleges, often referred to as CRUCH, and ran a centralized admission
system until 2012, when they decided to invite other colleges to join the centralized
system. In 1960, the share of admissions processed in the centralized assignment
scheme was 100 percent; however, by 2010, this share dropped to 50 as new colleges
and (bigger cohorts of) students entered the market. In 2012, the original CRUCH
colleges decided to invite other colleges to join the centralized admission system.
Eight of the non-CRUCH universities accepted the invitation, leading to an increase
in coordinated college admissions from 50 to 70 percent in 2012. The colleges that
accepted the invitation are roughly equivalent, in terms of quality and prestige, to
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the original CRUCH colleges.
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a theoretical model
that accounts for the adoption, maintenance, and expansion of a centralized admis-
sion system. The model shows that close competition by colleges, when application
costs exist, is crucial for the adoption of a centralized system by market participants.
Second, we empirically demonstrate the relevance of this market force using micro-
level administration data from Chile. We show that those colleges that accepted the
invitation were in fact those that had closely competed with the original CRUCH
colleges. Third, we study how centralization affected students’ welfare and show
that low-income students benefited the most from the change. That is, in Chile, the
centralization simplified application procedures and also reduced the monetary costs
associated with applications, which may be particularly useful to students from a
low socioeconomic background.
In our model, there is a continuum of students and two colleges (C1 and
C2). Students are assumed heterogeneous in terms of preference over the colleges,
test scores, and resources to cover application costs. Preferences regarding the two
colleges are stochastic. Based on the proportion of students that find C1 better
than C2, we measure the college quality of C1 relative to C2. For example, if that
proportion is one half, the two colleges are considered of equal quality. Regarding
resources, there are two types of students; when the two colleges run decentralized
admission processes, one type of student can afford to pay the applications costs of
the two colleges, while the other type can afford only one college application. When
the two colleges adopt a centralized admission, both types of students can apply to
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the two colleges with only one application cost.
Colleges admit students based only on their test scores, and their utility is
captured by the sum of the number of enrollees weighted by their test scores. When
admissions are decentralized, students face a portfolio problem, and many find it
in their best interest to apply to more than one college. If admitted, this strategy
ensures that they can enroll in their favorite college. This strategy is costly and not
all students can afford it. While some students are admitted to none, others are
admitted to multiple colleges, creating inefficiency.
Under a centralized admission that produces optimal, stable matching, stu-
dents are admitted to at most one college and no seats are left empty, provided that
someone applied for them. Colleges might find it optimal to join or not to join a
centralized admission system. When colleges run a centralized system, the appli-
cant pool is the largest. This enlarged pool may benefit a college by increasing the
number of enrollees and/or enrollees with higher test scores. However, this benefit
might be offset if the college loses applicants to competing colleges of higher quality.
This loss especially affects colleges that are able to enroll high-scoring students who
cannot afford to apply to many colleges in the decentralized system.
In our model, when colleges are of equal quality, the benefit of participation
outweighs the cost, while the opposite is true if the heterogeneity is sufficiently large.
From the students’ point of view, the wider coverage of the centralized admission
may improve some students’ welfare by enabling them to gain admissions to a higher
quality college and pay a lower application cost. This result implies that the benefit
from the centralized admission may be especially important for students of low-
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income backgrounds who cannot afford multiple application fees, and students who
are crowded out of admissions by high-ranking students who can afford multiple
applications.
The empirical analysis in this paper shows the relevance of our model assump-
tions and tests the model predictions using Chilean administrative data. Our pri-
mary data sources are application and enrollment data provided by Chile’s Ministry
of Education and other national agencies. From 2010 to 2013, we obtain detailed
information on college applicants such as their test score, the list of colleges and ma-
jors they applied to, socioeconomic background, and actual enrollment. Our sample
includes two years of college admissions prior to the 2012 change and two years after
the change. Comparing the pre and post-period outcomes allows us to examine the
changes in student and colleges’outcomes.
Consistent with our model, the 8 colleges that decided to join the centralized
admission are very similar to CRUCH universities in terms of average test scores and
student enrollment, relative to the universities that rejected the offer. After the 2012
change, both CRUCH and the 8 non-CRUCH universities showed an increase in the
sum of enrollees’ test scores, with comparable magnitude. Relatedly, the vacancy
rate, the share of quota unfilled, among CRUCH was reduced from 14 percent in
2011 to 7 percent in 2012.
As for students, we find that, compared to the 2012 change, students, partic-
ularly those of low economic status, are more likely to enroll in the 8 non-CRUCH
universities relative to CRUCH. As for student welfare analysis, we measure the
quality of a student’s major within the college (namely option) with the ranking
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based on the average test scores among enrollees from 2007 to 2009. We find that,
after the 2012 change, students are on average able to enroll a more prestigious ma-
jor option and such a benefit is particularly large for students of low socioeconomic
status.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents the set
of literature closely related to this paper and our contribution to it. In Section 3.3,
we describe the institutional background, explaining changes in the Chilean college
admission setting. In Section 3.4, we present a theoretical model accounting for the
Chilean setting and changes. Section 3.5 discusses our data, sample and empirical
approach, and in Section 3.6, we present empirical results testing model assump-
tions and implications, including the impact of widened coverage of the coordinated
assignment on student-college sorting. Section 3.7 discusses the sensitivity of our
analyses and implications, and Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
This study contributes to the market design literature on student-school match-
ing, particularly the ones that examine potential efficiency gains of a centralized
matching, in comparison to a decentralized one. Examples of recent research in this
literature includes Che and Koh (2016); Hafalir and Kübler (2016); Ekmekci and
Yenmez (2016); Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2015). Che and Koh (2016) and Hafalir and
Kübler (2016) theoretically examine schools’ strategies in attracting students and
compare the market efficiencies across several admission settings including a cen-
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tralized matching based Gale-Shapely algorithm and decentralized admission. Both
studies examine richer theoretical settings and support their theoretical assumptions
or results using observational or experimental data. Although our theoretical setting
is designed simple to capture the key features of the Chilean college admission, this
paper complements to these existing studies in twofold. One is that our theoretical
setting explicitly examines the distributional impact of the matching system from
the students’ perspective because students may differ in their ability to exploit the
inefficiency of the decentralized admission system. The other is that different from
these studies, we conduct a micro-econometric analysis to empirical examine the
impact on students as well as colleges.
Our paper is closely related to Ekmekci and Yenmez (2016) because it the-
oretically examines a school’s payoffs to participate in a coordinated admission.
Different from our findings, they find that the school has no incentive to join the
coordinated admission. This opposite finding is due to the two key difference in
the models: timing of the admission decisions and the application costs. In Ekmeki
and Yenmez, the school can postpone its admission process until all the rest have
finished admitting students and then go after students who have already been ad-
mitted by other schools. In contrast, our setting abstracts time, thus all schools run
their admissions at the same time. In addition, in our setting, students need to pay
costs to apply for a college that runs a decentralized admission while in Ekmekci
and Yenmez (2016) , there is no application costs. These differences in modeling
choices are rooted from the unique institutional settings. The US setting in Ekmekci
and Yenmez (2016) does not involve pronounced admission costs and some charter
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schools run admission decision at the different time from the public schools. In con-
trast, in Chile, students need to pay time and monetary costs to apply for a college
outside the centralized admission and such a college starts the admission decision at
the same time or earlier than those in the centralized admission. It is worth noting
that even if we allowed the possibility that a school may choose the timing of its
admission decision, we may still find the school’s incentive to join the centralized
admission. That is because, if a sizable number of the students with talents cannot
afford the application costs, then reaching out students after the centralized admis-
sion might not lead to the enrollment; thus joining the centralized admission may
be more attractive to that college because it enlarges the pool of applicants.
Another closely related paper is Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2015). It studies high
school assignment in New York City and shows showing a sizable welfare gain of a co-
ordinated single-offer system (i.e., centralized assignment) relative to an status-quo
uncoordinated assignment system. Our paper is closely related to Abdulkadiroğlu et
al. (2015) in that we also report sizable gains from the expansion of the centralized
assignment. However, our paper is substantially different from it because our focus
is on explaining the mechanism explaining the voluntary adoption and expansion of
the centralized admission, in the context of Chile, and also highlights the heteroge-
neous impact based on students’ family background that could affect the extent to
which they could get around the market inefficiency.
The market design studies examining the phenomenon of unraveling is another
literature this paper contributes to.
Besides these two strands of market design literature, our paper is related to a
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growing number of applied microeconomics studies using the Chilean college admis-
sion setting. Examples include Beyer et al. (2015); Bordon and Fu (2015); Hastings
et al. (2013a); Espinoza and Urzúa (2015); Lafortune et al. (2016); Kaufmann et
al. (2013); Rau et al. (2013); Rodríguez et al. (2016); Turner (2014); Rios et al.
(2014). Most of these studies exploit the Chilean coordinated assignment setting
to construct counterfactuals of student outcomes by comparing those whose test
scores were just above the cutoff point for admissions with those whose test scores
were just below the cutoff. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to examine both coordinated and uncoordinated assignment in the Chilean college
admission setting and to empirically examine the impact of the 2012 expansion of
the coordinated assignment on both college and students’ outcomes.
3.3 Institutional Background
3.3.1 Universities
Chilean universities are classified into two groups: CRUCH (Consejo de Rec-
tores de las Universidades Chilenas) and the rest (herein, non-CRUCH).4 The
CRUCH universities, a total of 25, have a long history and prestige in Chile similar
4In Chile, there are three types of institutions provide tertiary education: universities (Uni-
versidades), Professional Institutes (PI, Institutos Profesionales), and Technical Training Centers
(TTC, Centros de Formación Técnica). We study student-college matching only for the case of
universities because PIs and TTCs are designed for technical or vocational training, and they ac-
cept virtually all applicants regardless of their academic performance. Throughout this document,
we use “university” to refer only to Universidades, not to PI or TTC.
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to Ivy League colleges in the US. They coordinate student selection, which will be
described in detail in Section 3.3.2. In contrast, non-CRUCH universities, a total
of 34 as of 2013, are relatively new, mostly established in between 1988 and 1990.
This difference in the year of establishment is due to the fact that the Chilean gov-
ernment had strictly restricted the establishment of new universities but relaxed the
restriction in 1988.5
3.3.2 College Admission System: General
Each academic year, universities publicly announce the number of vacancies
for every major program they offer and how they evaluate applicants. The Chilean
universities in our study evaluate students based almost entirely on a student’s aca-
demic performance on a nationwide test called the Prueba de Selección Universitaria
(PSU), which is typically conducted at the beginning of December. The PSU con-
sists of 4 subjects: math, language, science, and social sciences, and the weight that
5Prior to 1981, the Chilean government strictly restricted the establishment of universities. Al-
though the legal change in 1981 relaxed this restriction, establishing a university was still difficult
until 1988. This is because the Chilean government had substantial discretion regarding whom it
would allow to establish a university. For this reason, only 5 universities were established between
1981 and 1987. However, from 1988, the Chilean government allowed an entity to establish a
university as long as it satisfied pre-determined requirements. This relaxation sparked new uni-
versities. For example, between 1988 and 1990, 35 universities were established. Some universities
have been established or have closed since 1990. As of 2013, there were 34 non-CRUCH universi-
ties; all except one were established by 1990. The only non-CRUCH university was established in
2012, and we exclude it from our analysis.
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each program puts on each subject varies program by program. The test score for
each subject is standardized to have a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of
110. The PSU score is released in mid to late December and, with their PSU score,
students apply to colleges.
The coalition of CRUCH universities accepts college applications by early Jan-
uary and announces the results within 2 or 3 weeks. The admission procedure is
based on a centralized matching system as follows: until 2011, a student needed to
submit his/her preference by ranking up to 8 options, that is, 8 unique combinations
of university and college major; since 2012, it has been 10 options. Once the stu-
dent’s rank orders are collected, the board runs the student-proposed deferred and
acceptance (DA) algorithm and notifies the student of the results approximately 2
to 3 weeks later.
In contrast, the admission process of the non-CRUCH universities is such that
a student’s chance of being admitted depends not only on his/her PSU score but
also on when he/she applies. Specifically, a non-CRUCH university announces the
number of vacancies and the minimum PSU score in each major it offers before
the application process takes place. It starts to accept applications the day after
the PSU score is released. To apply, except for a few universities, students and
their representatives (e.g., parents, siblings) need to physically visit a university’s
admissions office. When a student meets with a college admissions officer, the officer
informs the student whether he/she can get an admission for a particular major on
the spot. If the student is not accepted for that major, he/she can apply for another
major right away. Figure 3.1 shows a timeline of both application processes.
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of the Admission Process
Note: This figure illustrates the timeline of college admission processes in Chile.
The top panel illustrates the process of the universities that use the centralized
matching system (namely, CRUCH until 2011 and CRUCH and 8 non-CRUCH
universities from 2012). The bottom panel illustrates the admission process of the
universities that joined the centralized matching system.
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An applicant to such a college will be accepted as long as the following three
conditions are satisfied. First, the applicant’s PSU must be above the minimum
score the university specified for the applicant’s chosen major. Second, the number
of accepted applicants for that specific major must be fewer than the number of
vacancies in that program, as set by the university. Third, the applicant must show
financial proof that he/she can afford tuition and must pay a deposit to secure a
space, amounting to about 28% of the average household income in Chile as of 2013.6
Because the second condition constitutes a type of first-come, first-served rule, it
creates an incentive for applicants to enroll as soon as possible once the PSU scores
are announced. The photos in Appendix A illustrate how chaotic the decentralized
application process can be. Numerous individuals line up in front of a university
the night before the day the university accepts applications (this is typically the
same day that the PSU score is released), and they submit their applications in a
first-come, first-served fashion.7
If the applicant decides not to enroll in the major, he/she must notify the
university within 10 days of the date that the CRUCH admission results are publicly
announced. Article 3 in the Consumer Protection Act, grants universities the right
6The amount of the deposit can vary not only by university but also by major. For example,
the deposit for Medicine at Universidad del Desarrollo was 125% of the average household income
in 2013.
7Typically, PSU scores are announced on a Sunday at midnight and students start enrolling in
non-CRUCH universities at 6:00 or 7:00 am the following Monday in order to secure a slot. In the
most highly demanded universities, the situation is chaotic. Crowds of people congregate at the
admissions office at dawn and others spend the night waiting for the office to open.
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to retain an amount equivalent to 1% of total annual tuition fees. The amount
of the deposit varies across universities and majors but is generally 10% of total
annual tuition fees. That is, if an applicant decides not to enroll, the university
keeps roughly 10% of the deposit and reimburses the rest within 10 days from when
the student notified the university of his/her decision.
3.3.3 College Admission System: The change in 2012
Prior to the 2012 college admission cycle, the centralized matching system was
only for CRUCH universities because centralized matching was the result of volun-
tary coordination among the CRUCH universities. On April 29, 2011, the associa-
tion of the CRUCH universities announced that they would invite all non-CRUCH
universities to join the centralized matching system. The deadline for responding
to the invitation was May 25, 2011. Eight non-CRUCH universities accepted the
invitation and became a part of the centralized matching system starting with the
2012 college admission cycle.8 The rest of the non-CRUCH universities remained
outside the centralized matching system.
8Universidad Adolfo Ibañez, Universidad de los Andes, Universidad del Desarrollo, Universi-





We consider an environment in which there are two groups of colleges. The
centralized colleges jointly admit students using the student-proposing Gale-Shapley
algorithm from a common pool of applications. The decentralized colleges admit
students independently. We assume that students face uncertainty in the application
process. In particular, after submitting their preferences to the centralized group,
students do not know if the assigned college in the centralized system will be better or
worse than their best achievable option in the decentralized group. This uncertainty
provides incentives for some students to apply to both groups. A student admitted
to one college in each group can select his favorite one. This strategy, however,
has two social costs. First, some students will not be admitted to a college that
otherwise would admit them. Second, some colleges will be left with vacant seats.
This section shows that these two effects can incentivize both groups of colleges to
form a unique centralized admission system.
We model this environment with only two colleges, C1 and C2. In this model,
C1 represents the centralized group of colleges and C2 represents the decentralized
group. Although C1 and C2 are single colleges in the model, the student uncertainty
model is used to ensure that C1 represents a group of colleges using the student-
proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm and C2 represents a group of colleges running
independent admission processes. We compare the outcomes of C1 and C2 running
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independent admission systems and a joint admission system. We study the con-
ditions under which both C1 and C2 have incentives to use the student-proposing
Gale-Shapley algorithm from a common pool of applications.
In the general situation, when the centralized and the decentralized colleges
run their admission systems independently, students applying to the centralized
group use their (weakly) dominant strategy and submit their true preferences. At
the same time, they can use their expected assigned college to determine if it is
profitable to apply to a specific college in the decentralized group. Before enrollment,
the assignment in the centralized group is revealed and the student can choose
between the assigned college in the centralized group and the chosen college in the
decentralized group. When C1 and C2 are modeled as a single college, these features
are introduced by assuming that students’ preferences are drawn after applying but
before enrolling.
In the case of a joint admission system that uses the student-proposing Gale-
Shapley algorithm, students use their (weakly) dominant strategy and submit their
true preferences for all colleges. When C1 and C2 are modeled as a single college, this
feature is introduced by assuming that the students’ preferences are drawn before
applying.
There is a unit-mass continuum of students. Students take a national exam
before the admission process and each student knows his score s before applying.
Scores follow a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing cumulative distri-
bution function F with density f with full support over the interval [s, s], F (s) is
the mass of students with score less than or equal to s. We identify students by their
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score, so student s has a score of s. Student preferences are stochastic. Independent
of test scores or other students’ preferences, each student prefers college C1 to C2
with probability p ∈ [0, 1/2]. For all students, their most preferred college provides
a utility of u1, strictly greater than the utility of their second choice u2. That is, p
portion of students have utilities u1 for C1 and u2 for C2, and the rest u2 for C1 and
u1 for C2. Being unassigned has a value of zero.
Colleges admit the best ranked students who applied, up to their quota. Thus,
students with sufficiently high test cores can enroll in their most preferred colleges
with certainty. Without loss of generality, we omit such students from our analysis
and define a quota in each college as the remaining number of seats after netting
out those students. We assume that Ci can enroll up to qi students and the sum
of the two is less than the student mess (i.e., q1 + q2 < 1). Thus, there is always
a mass of students who cannot get enrolled in any college. Applying to C1 is free
and accessible to everyone, but applying to C2 has an application cost of k and not
everyone can apply due to the cost. The proportion of students who can cover this
cost, the “wealthy students”, is n. Since applying to C1 has no cost, we assume
that every student applies to C1. Colleges value the quality and quantity of the
students they admit. In particular, colleges derive utility of u(E) = ∫E xf(x)dx
from enrolling the set of students E.
Colleges C1 and C2 decide simultaneously whether or not to form a centralized
admission system that uses the student-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. The cost
of organizing the centralized admission system is M ≥ 0 for each college.
In our setting, the Gale-Shapley algorithm generates student optimal matching
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- that is, based on their test scores, students choose their most favorite college among
those with available seats. Let si be the admission cutoff score for college Ci. Based
on the Chilean setting, we focus on equilibrium outcomes satisfying s2 ≥ s1. This
order obtains if the proportion of wealthy students is sufficiently big relative to the




An enrollment outcome is a triple of pair-wise disjoint sets E = (E0, E1, E2),
where Ei for i = 1, 2 is the set of students enrolled at college Ci and E0 is the set
of students who were not admitted to any college. The enrollment of student s is
denoted by Es ∈ {∅, C1, C2}. The enrollment outcome (E0, E1, E2) is efficient if there
is no enrollment outcome E ′ such that us(Es) ≤ us(E
′
s) for all s and u(Ei) ≤ u(E ′i)
for i = 1, 2 with strict inequality for at least one college or a positive mass of
students.
3.4.2 Market Structure
3.4.2.1 Descentralized enrollment outcomes
This section analyses enrollment outcomes when C1 and C2 run independent
admission systems. Let s2 ≥ s1 be the cutoff scores of each college. Given these
cutoff scores, students decide to apply to colleges. Application decisions are as
follows. All students with score s ≥ s1 apply to college C1. Applying to both C1
and C2 gives students the possibility of choosing their most preferred colleges among
those that admitted them, but has a cost of k. A student with score s ≥ s2 applies
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to both C1 and C2 if u1 ≥ up + k, where up = u1p + (1 − p)u2. It is assumed that
k satisfies the inequality. Applying only to C2 is dominated by applying to both.
A student who gets admitted to both C1 and C2 gets a utility of u1 − k; a student
who gets admitted only to C1 gets an expected utility of up.
The equilibrium cutoff scores sD1 , sD2 are defined by the following two equations:
1− F (sD1 ) = q1 (3.1)
n(1− F (sD2 )) = q2 (3.2)
Preference uncertainty is resolved after applying but before enrollment. Students
who got admitted to more than one college have the option to enroll in their most
preferred college, leaving a seat vacant at the least preferred college. Total enroll-
ment in C1 is given by three groups of students: i) the students who could have been
admitted to C2 but did not have the resources to apply, ii) those who applied and
were admitted to both C1 and C2 but preferred C1, and iii) those who got admit-
ted only to C1. Enrollment in C2 is given by the students who have the resources,
applied, got admitted to C2, and prefer C2 over C1. We use EDi to denote the mass
of students enrolled in college i when they use a decentralized admission system.
Enrollment masses are as follows:
ED1 = (1− n)(1− F (sD2 )) + np(1− F (sD2 )) + F (sD2 )− F (sD1 ) (3.3)
ED2 = n(1− p)(1− F (sD2 )) (3.4)
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The basic consequences of the decentralized admission system on enrollment
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the decentralized admission system, total enrollment is q1 and
there are q2 students that would like to be enrolled in either college and that would
be admitted, but did not get a seat in the admission process.
Proof. Direct addition of equations (3) and (4) reveal that total enrollment is equal
to q1. Since being unassigned has a value of zero, every student would like to being
admitted to a college. At the moment of enrollment, college C1 finds out that
(1−p)q2 admitted students did not enroll. Similarly, C2 discovers that pq2 admitted
students did not enroll. Hence, there are q2 students that would be admitted after
enrollment decisions have been made.
We call “inefficient assignments” those admissions given to students that later
do not enroll, (1 − p)q2 for C1 and pq2 for C2. Colleges’ and students’ (ex-post)
welfare follow directly from the enrollment equations. We measure colleges’ utility
by the number of admitted students, weighted by their score. This metric takes
into account both the quantity and quality of enrolled students. Students’ welfare
is measure by the utility they obtain from enrolling in a particular college. uD1 , uD2
represent C1 and C2 payoffs, respectively. uDn , uD1−n represent aggregate students
welfare for the wealthy and non-wealthy students, respectively.












uDn = n(1− F (sD2 ))u1 + n(F (sD2 )− F (sD1 ))up (3.7)
uD1−n = (1− n)(1− F (sD2 ))up + (1− n)(F (sD2 )− F (sD1 ))up (3.8)
3.4.2.2 Centralized enrollment outcomes
This section analyses the outcomes of a centralized admission system, the
student-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. Let s2 ≥ s1 be the cutoff scores of each
college. Applying to the centralized system is denoted as applying to C and has no
cost. In the centralized admission process, students can send their college preferences
and apply to both C1 and C2 in order of preference. In this section, it is assumed
that the preference uncertainty is resolved before applying; thus, the preferences list
reflects true ex-post preferences. Application behavior is as follows.
All students with score s ≥ s1 apply to college C by sending their preference
ranking over C1 and C2. In the centralized system, admission and enrollment co-
incide; thus the mass of students enrolled in each college and the cutoff scores are
defined by the same equations. The equilibrium cutoff scores sC1 , sC2 and enrollment
masses EC1 , EC2 are defined by:
EC1 = p(1− F (sC2 )) + F (sC2 )− F (sC1 ) = q1 (3.9)
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EC2 = (1− p)(1− F (sC2 )) = q2 (3.10)
The left hand side of these equations describes enrollment. Total enrollment
in C1 is given by the students who i) could have been admitted to C2 but preferred
C1 and ii) those who got admitted only to C1. Enrollment in C2 is given by the
students who got admitted to C2. The allocation of students to colleges is efficient.












uCn = n(1− F (sC2 ))u1 + n(F (sC2 )− F (sC1 ))up (3.13)
uC1−n = (1− n)(1− F (sC2 ))u1 + (1− n)(F (sC2 )− F (sC1 ))up (3.14)
Proposition 2. The centralized admission system produces an efficient enrollment
outcome.
Proof. Let E be the outcome of the centralized admission system and suppose E ′
is another enrollment outcome that Pareto dominates E. Hence there is a mass of
students that have a different enrollment in E than in E ′. Consider this to be the
case for E ′1 \E1; other cases are analogous. This group of students strictly prefer C1
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over their assignment in E. Hence they were rejected by C1 during the admission
process. It follows that all of these students have strictly lower scores than students
E ′1 \ E1. In addition, E ′1 \ E1 mass is at most the mass of E ′1 \ E1.
3.4.3 Equilibrium analysis
The existence of efficiency gains with the adoption of a centralized admission
system seems to suggest that colleges, in general, will have a natural tendency to be
centralized. However, this is not the case. In fact, just the opposite is true. A lot of
admission systems are run independently and sometimes centralization occurs after
there is intervention by a policy maker. In this section we study when colleges have
incentives to join a centralized admission system.
Motivated by the Chilean setting, we introduce the two additional assumptions
into our equilibrium analysis. In Chile, there are CRUCH colleges that are very
desirable for their quality; hence, there are wealthy students that prefer to apply to
and enroll in those colleges. In this model, CRUCH colleges are represented by C1.
Thus we assume that C1 is of “sufficient quality” to attract wealthy students, i.e.,
1− n ≤ p. Another feature of the Chilean setting that we include in our analysis is
that the cutoff scores of Type 2 colleges decreased after they joined the centralized
system, but not to the level of CRUCH cutoffs before centralization. Hence we
assume that C2 is also of “sufficient quality” i.e., q2q1 ≤ 1− p.
Proposition 3. Cutoff scores are characterized as follows:
• Suppose there are enough wealthy students i.e., q2
q1
≤ n, then sC1 ≤ sC2 and
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sD1 ≤ sD2 .
• Suppose there are enough wealthy students and C1 is of sufficient quality i.e.,
1− n ≤ p, then sC2 ≤ sD2 .
• Suppose there are enough wealthy students and C2 is of sufficient quality i.e.,
q2
q1
≤ 1− p, then sD1 ≤ sC2 .
Proof. Direct comparison of equations (1), (2), (9) and (10).
We analyze equilibrium behavior next. The two colleges play a simultaneous
game: C1 and C2 have to decide whether or not to join a centralized admission
system. The equilibrium of this game depends on p, the proportion of students that
prefer C1. When p is large (close to 1/2), it is common knowledge that students
regard C1 and C2 as having the same quality (we assume that preferences are derived
from quality) since half of the population prefers one to the other. In this case,
inefficient assignments are equally distributed and efficiency gains equally captured;
hence, both C1 and C2 have an incentive to join a centralized admission system.
When p is small (close to 0), C2 suffers little inefficiency (the inefficiencies suffered
by C1 are the greatest), and joining a centralized matching does not allows C2 to
capture any efficiency gain; hence, C2 would not join the centralized system.
When C1 has decided to join, C2 faces incentives characterized by the following
function:








J2(n, p) is the difference in payoff between joining the centralized admission
system and remaining decentralized for college C2. When college C2 joins the cen-
tralized system with college C1, it gains access to high-scoring students who would
be enrolled in college C1 if the system were decentralized. In addition, the efficient
centralized system would avoid the admission of students who would not enroll later
on, expanding the possibility of admitting students with scores below the decentral-
ized cutoff score.
Proposition 4. Suppose there are enough wealthy students and the cost of orga-




J2(n, p) = J1(n, p); then, it is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for C1 and C2 to join a
centralized admission system.
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of J2(n, p) and J1(n, p).
J1(n, p) identifies the incentives faced by college C1. When C1 and C2 run a
centralized admission system, C1 can admit students who were previously rejected
because of the admission of high-scoring students who eventually did not enroll.
However, C1 loses its exclusivity with high-scoring-low-income students who can
only apply to it. In addition, C1 loses students who would be rejected by C2 in the
decentralized system but are admitted in the centralized system due to the more
efficient process. We begin our equilibrium analysis with the symmetric case: C1
and C2 are identical in all respects with the exception of p. In all cases, the cost
of organizing the centralized system needs to be below certain threshold i.e., a high
cost of organizing the market could prevent the centralization even if, absent the
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cost, both colleges would like to join the centralized admission system. In this case,





Proposition 5. Suppose both colleges C1 and C2 are identical in all respects but
their probability of being preferred, i.e., every student can afford both types of colleges
n = 1 and both have the same quotas q1 = q2 = q. Suppose the cost of organizing a




−1(t)dt. Then there are two types
of equilibria:
• If M < min{J1(1, p) : p ∈ [0, 12 ]}, then there is p
∗ such that for all p ∈ [p∗, 1
2
]
C1 and C2 organizing a centralized admission system is a Nash equilibrium
(type 1).
• If M ≥ min{J1(1, p) : p ∈ [0, 12 ]}, then there are p
1, p2 and p3 such that for all
p ∈ [p1, p2] ∪ [p3, 1
2
] C1 and C2 organizing a centralized admission system is a
Nash equilibrium (type 2).






















> 0. If M <
min{J1(1, p) : p ∈ [0, 12 ]}, then C1 would like to join a centralized admission sys-






≥ 0; then J2(1, p) is a continuous and strictly
increasing function in the interval [0, 1
2
]; thus, there is p∗ such that M = J2(1, p∗)












= 0. J2(1, p) is a strictly increasing function in the interval [0, p∗∗];
105
thus, there is p1 such that M = J2(1, p1) and J2(1, p) ≥ M for all p ≥ p1. If
M ≥ min{J1(1, p) : p ∈ [0, 12 ]}, then necessarily J1(1, p) is a strictly decreasing
function in the interval [0, p∗∗] and strictly increasing in the interval [p∗∗, 1
2
]; thus,
there are p2 and p3 such that M = J1(1, p2) = J1(1, p3) such that J1(1, p) ≥ M for
all p ≤ p2 and for all p ≥ p3.
Both equilibria confirm the basic intuition. When colleges are of equal quality,
half the population likes one better than the other; then inefficient matches are
evenly distributed in the decentralized system, and the efficiency gains created by
the adoption of a centralized admission system are equally captured. Equilibrium
type 1 confirms the converse intuition: when p is small, then C1 would benefit a lot
from running a centralized admission system; C2, however, gains little since it suffers
little inefficiency as most admitted students actually enroll. Equilibrium type 2 also
confirms the basic intuition: when p is close to 1/2 but it also displays centralization
for an interior region. In this region, C1 faces similar incentives as in equilibrium
type 1, but now C2 also benefits from joining because the students who are enrolled
in the centralized admission system have a high score.
When not all students are wealthy, n < 1, a new kind of equilibrium arises.
If the cost of centralization is low enough, equilibrium type 1 prevails. However, if
the cost of running a centralized system is high, then C1 might find it in its best
interest not to invite C2 to join because that would imply losing good students who
are accessible only to C1.

















F−1(t)dt]; then the equilibria are as follows:
• If M < min{J1(1, p) : p ∈ [0, 12 ]}, then there is p
∗ such that for all p ∈ [p∗, 1
2
]
C1 and C2 organizing a centralized admission system is a Nash equilibrium
(type 1).
• If J1(1, 12) ≥M ≥ min{J1(1, p) : p ∈ [0,
1
2
]}, then there are p1, p2, p3 such that
for all p ∈ [p1, p2]∪ [p3, 1
2
] C1 and C2 organizing a centralized admission system
is a Nash equilibrium (type 2).
• If M ≥ J1(1, 12), then there are p
4, p5 such that for all p ∈ [p4, p5] C1 and C2
organizing a centralized admission system is a Nash equilibrium (type 3).













Since J2 is a concave function (derivative given in proposition 4), there is p∗ ∈
(0, 1/2] such that J2 is a continuous and strictly increasing function. Thus, there
is p∗∗ ∈ (0, p∗) such that J2(n, p∗∗) = J1(n, p∗∗). If M < min{J1(1, p) : p ∈ [0, 12 ]},
then there is p∗ such that for all p ∈ [p∗, 1
2




) ≥ M ≥ min{J1(1, p) : p ∈ [0, 12 ]}, then there are p
1, p2 and p3 defined by
M = J2(n, p
1)=J1(n, p2) = I(n, p3) such that p1 < p2 < p∗ < p3. If M ≥ J1(n, 1/2),
then there are p4, p5 such that for all p ∈ [p4, p5] such thatM = J2(n, p4) = J1(n, p5)
and p1 < p2 < p∗.
We next analyze matches between students and colleges. High-income students
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will be denoted as H students and low-income students as L students. Based on their
test scores, we classify students into 4 groups. Group 1 consists of students whose
test score is higher than the cutoff of type 2 colleges before type 2 colleges joined
the centralized system (i.e., sD2 ). Group 2 consists of students whose test score is
between sC2 and sD2 . Group 3 consists of students whose test score is between sD1 and
sC2 . Group 4 includes students whose test score is between sC1 and sD1 . We denote
by Ig, students in income group I ∈ H,L belonging to test score group g ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4.
The centralization of the college admission affects each group as follows:
• H1 – There is no change in matching quality for these students. Before type 2
joined the centralized system, these students were able to enroll in their most
favorite college by using multiple applications. In the centralized system, their
score is all they need to get into their most favorite college.
• L1 – These students are matched to better colleges after type 2 colleges join
the centralized system. Only the fraction for whom a type 2 college is better
obtains this benefit. Their benefit comes directly from the lower application
costs.
• H2 – These students are matched to better colleges after type 2 colleges join
the centralized system. Only the fraction for whom a type 2 college is better
obtains this benefit. These students benefit from the more efficient centralized
system.
• L2 - These students are matched to better colleges after type 2 colleges join
the centralized system. Only the fraction for whom a type 2 college is better
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obtains this benefit. These students benefit from the more efficient centralized
system.
• H3 - There is no change in matching quality for these students. Their score is
not high enough to be admitted to type 2 colleges; hence, there are matches
to CRUCH colleges in both systems.
• L3 - There is no change in matching quality for these students. Their score is
not high enough to be admitted to type 2 colleges; hence, there are matches
to CRUCH colleges in both systems.
• H4 – These students get into a better college under the centralized system.
Before centralization, these students were admitted by type 3 colleges and by
CRUCH colleges after the change.
• L4 – These students also get into a better college after the change, but the in-
crease is bigger than for H4 students, since they go from no-college to CRUCH
colleges.
3.4 Application to the Chilean Setting and Testable Implications
We analyze the equilibrium characterization in the context of the Chilean
setting. First, we consider what may account for the fact that CRUCH universities
formed a centralized admission system in the first place. In our model, p, the share
of students who prefer college 1 the most, is sufficiently close to 1/2 ; then C1 will
invite the rest of schools and may form a coalition. In the context of real college
admission, we can view this condition as the one under which college quality is
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sufficiently homogeneous across CRUCH universities. We will examine this condition
by comparing college quality in 1967, when the centralized admission system was
established. Second, we consider what may account for the fact that the CRUCH
invited the rest of the universities in 2012, more than a decade after the non-CRUCH
universities were established. In the context of the model, we can consider C1
as CRUCH as a whole, C2 as the 8 non-CRUCH that joined the coordination,
and the rest of the non-CRUCH as outside options that are dominated by C1 and
C2. When enough students prefer CRUCH universities to other universities (i.e.,
sufficiently high p), there is little incentive to invite them since there are only a
small mass of students who would have been admitted to CRUCH but were not.
If the 8 non-CRUCH colleges increased in quality over time, students started to
prefer those over CRUCH colleges, implying p’s decrease. Therefore, eventually p
reached a level at which joining a centralized admission system was the best for
both types of colleges. With data, we will examine the extent to which college
qualities are comparable between CRUCH and non-CRUCH. The data will show
that on average both CRUCH and the 8 non-CRUCH should be better off after
the 2012 change. Third, all else being equal, the 2012 change will improve student
welfare, much more so for the students of low socioeconomic status. In our model,
the centralized admission improves efficiency relative to the decentralized admission
because it eliminates offers that are not accepted by applicants and thus are not
filled. This prediction implies, in the Chilean context, that on average applicants
can get admission to a more prestigious option (i.e., a specific combination of college
and major) due to the 2012 change. In our model, this positive effect on applicants
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is larger for those who could not afford application costs of C2 because under the
centralized admission, they can no longer pay application costs. Relatedly, removing
the application costs will increase the enrollment of those students in C2.
3.5 Data, Sample, and Empirical Strategy
In testing our model predictions, we use both qualitative and quantitative
analyses depending on data availability. Specifically, examining Prediction 1 requires
historical information from the 1960s, and we rely on existing studies for this analysis
because there is no data source we can access. In contrast, the rest of the predictions
require recent information, which we can directly test using the data below.
3.5.1 Data Source
We compile our sample for the 2007-2013 college admission cycles, based on
administrative datasets from three different sources: CNED (Consejo Nacional de
Educacion), SIES (Servicio de Información de Educación Superior), and DEMRE
(Departamento de Evaluación, Medición y Registro Educacional).9 The CNED pro-
vides major level information such as number of faculty members, amenities a col-
lege offers, tuition, and expected duration of study. The SIES provides university
9The SIES is compiled by the Chilean Ministry of Education. The DEMRE is an administra-
tive body within the Universidad de Chile that develops and administers the PSU and runs the
centralized matching system. CNED is an independent and autonomous public organization that
licenses new universities and provides assistance to the Ministry of Education when implementing
new educational policies.
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enrollees’ information. Specifically, we obtain information on students who were
freshmen at a university between 2007 and 2013. For each college enrollee, we ob-
serve his/her PSU score, major and university, high school GPA, age, residential
location, and type of high school (private, private with voucher, or public).10 Fi-
nally, the DEMRE provides information on the students’ application behaviors in
terms of the universities participating in the centralized matching. This informa-
tion includes each applicant’s PSU score, socio-economic characteristics, and, more
importantly, the rank order of options.
3.5.2 Sample and Outcome Variables
We construct a dataset covering 55 universities, 25 CRUCH and 30 non-
CRUCH, and all students who enrolled at one of the universities between 2007
and 2013. The 4 non-CRUCH universities operating as of 2013 are omitted from
our data.11 The reason is that one non-CRUCH was established in 2012 and thus
lacks information prior to the admission system change. As for the remaining 3
non-CRUCH universities, one of which joined the centralized matching, the SIES
does not include the information on their enrollees.
Our outcomes of interest are quality of enrollees, for university-level analyses,
10School types are highly correlated with students’ socioeconomic background. Wealthier stu-
dents typically attend private schools without vouchers, and poorer students typically attend public
schools (see Elacqua and Santos, 2013)
11The three non-CRUCH universities that lack enrollee information are Universidad Mayor
(which joined the centralized system), Universidad Gabriela Mistral, and Universidad los Leones.
The university established in 2012 is Universidad la Araucana.
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and prestige of an option for which a student was able to enroll, for student-level
analyses. For the former, we characterize an enrollee’s quality as his/her PSU score,
defined as the simple average between the scores in the math and language subjects.
We use this measure do student quality for two reasons. First, since the math
and language subjects are mandatory the simple average is a statistic that can be
computed for all students. Second, since the weight that each program puts on each
of the four subject varies program by program, students can easily be compared to
each by looking at their math and language scores. Finally, this statistics is widely
used for official purposes. For example, the government grants a subsidy, called
AFI, to all institutions enrolling the top 27.500 PSU scores, and uses the average
between math and language to rank students.
A college’s utility is defined as the sum of enrollees’PSU scores. For the prestige
of an option, we construct a relative ranking of an option across all available options
as follows. Across the three-year period (2007 to 2009), we take the average of
an option’s minimum PSU scores (i.e., cutoffs) with which an applicant could get
admission to the option in a given year. We then sort options in ascending order
and use the percentile into which an option falls (among the distribution of the
average cutoffs) as our measure of “prestige”. In our sample, we have on average
1,467 unique options in a given academic year. The option whose prestige is 1
in our prestige index ranked the lowest, while the option whose prestige is 100
ranked the highest. We decide to use this statistic for student outcomes for two
reasons. One reason is practicality. That is, if we knew applicants’ preferences
across options from CRUCH and non-CRUCH universities, we could construct an
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alternative statistic based on the preference ranking. However, we can infer students’
preferences only from applications through centralized matching (CRUCH and some
of non-CRUCH after the change). Therefore, for about 31.2% percent of options
as of 2012 (i.e., share of type 3 options out of all options in 2012) we do not have
relevant information, making it difficult to analyze student outcomes. In sum, the
two are highly correlated, supporting the relevance of our prestige variable. The
other reason concerns labor market opportunities. Although our measure of prestige
does not incorporate an individual-specific preference over options, it may reflect
average monetary returns from college education either because students on average
apply more to the well-paying options, pushing the PSU scores of admitted students
higher, and/or because, as the ranking is well correlated with the average cognitive
skills of admitted students, students may use it as signaling device to get better
labor market outcomes after college graduate.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for Chilean universities. In our sample
period, 2010 to 2013, our dataset includes 25 CRUCH universities and 30 non-
CRUCH universities (Panels A and B, respectively). In general, the two groups
of universities are comparable in terms of the number of newly enrolled students
and average PSU scores among enrollees. Although CRUCH universities on average
impose smaller tuition fees and offer more majors than non-CRUCH, there exist siz-
able variations within each group, resulting from sufficient overlaps in distribution of
each characteristic. However, we observe noticeable differences in terms of the share
of students residing in metropolitan areas and the types of high schools enrollees
graduated from. Specifically, on average, 42 percent of enrollees in CRUCH univer-
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sities resided in the three most heavily populated regions (Metropolitan Region, V
Region and VIII Region), which are where the three largest metropolitan areas are
located: Santiago, Valparaíso-Viña del Mar and Concepción, respectively. This is
roughly 30 percentage points lower compared to average non-CRUCH universities.
This difference may be driven by two factors: one is that the most non-CRUCH
universities are located in the metropolitan areas. The other is that to apply to a
non-CRUCH university, an applicant has to be physically present at the university,
implying that students residing in the metropolitan areas may find it easier to apply
to one compared to their counterparts who have to travel.
Regarding high schools, we classify high schools into three groups – private,
voucher, and public. The share of enrollees who graduated from a private high
school is much higher in non-CRUCH universities compared to CRUCH universi-
ties. It is important to highlight that the type of high school a student attends is
well correlated with his/her parental background and also that school quality may
substantially vary across types.12
12Our empirical analysis uses the ownership of each high school as a proxy for the socio-economic
status of their students. High schools can be private with no subsidies (high socioeconomic status
(SES)), private with voucher (Medium SES) and public (low SES). This SES measure has been
largely used in the Chilean context to characterize SES. To show the relevance of our approach
to the Chilean context, we obtain the additional data from the Ministry of Education of Chile
(MOE). For each high school, the MOE collects the following student information: mother’s years
of schooling, father ’s years of schooling, family income and student vulnerability. A student is
classified as vulnerable if she lives in extreme poverty according to the government’s standard.
Following Agencia de Calidad de Educación (2012), each variable is averaged at the school level
and then schools are clustered into the five SES categories : High, Medium High, Medium, Medium-
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Table 3.1: Universities: Summary Statistics (2010-2013)
Average S.D. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. CRUCH
Tuition 4,205.93 899.56 2586.66 7027.8
Number of majors offered 33.38 12.06 14 67
No of newly enrolled students 2,208.36 1400.52 448 6404
Average PSU among enrollees 583.5 43.88 517.53 697.11
Sum of enrollee’s PSUs 1,256.89 882.01 208.42 3826.13
Student composition
- (%)age over 20 24.49% 6.66% 10.08% 41.80%
- from 3 metropolitan areas 41.96% 38.19% 2.56% 90.81%
- from private schools 11.26% 13.28% 0.52% 62.58%
- from voucher schools 54.29% 10.26% 22.00% 73.53%
Panel B. Non-CRUCH
Tuition 6,656.17 1067.75 4550.33 8203.91
Number of majors offered 26.04 15.4 5 63
No of newly enrolled students 2,779.46 2620.42 776 9665
Average PSU among enrollees 609.08 32.53 556.14 659.24
Sum of enrollee’s PSUs 1,485.93 1273.86 382.16 4843.41
Student composition
- (%) age over 20 41.52% 18.02% 10.32% 92.38%
- from 3 metropolitan areas 70.11% 18.41% 20.15% 91.21%
- from private schools 19.57% 23.99% 0.00% 85.51%
- from voucher schools 49.53% 17.54% 6.62% 78.57%
Note: The unit of observation is university by year (2010 to 2013), total of 220.
The sample include all 25 CRUCH universities and 30 non-CRUCH universities.
Unweighted averages are reported. Tuition is reported in 2009 USD. The 3
metropolitan areas are XIII (Metropolitan), VIII Region (Concepción), and V
Region (Valparaíso-Viña del Mar). “Students from private schools” and “Students
from subsidized schools” refer to the share of enrollees who graduated from a
private high school without any government subsidy, and from a voucher school,
that is, a private school whose tuition is subsidized by the Chilean government.
The omitted category is a public high school.
116
Table 3.2: High School Types and SES
High School Types SES Categories by MOE
Low Medium-Low Medium Medium-High High
Public 79.30% 53.10% 29.10% 10.80% 0.00%
Voucher 20.70% 46.90% 70.90% 84.80% 7.10%
Private 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 4.50% 92.90%
Private high schools are the most expensive, followed by voucher schools (sim-
ilar to charter schools in the US), and then public high schools. Naturally, parents
who send their children to private schools are mostly well off compared to those
who send their children to voucher or public schools (see Gallego and Hernando,
2009; Bravo et al., 2010; Elacqua, 2012). Table 3.3 reports summary statistics of
college enrollees between 2010 and 2013. Panel A reports the average characteris-
tics of college enrollees depending on the types of high schools they graduated from
(columns 1 to 3). Our dataset includes over 0.4 million enrollees. Twenty percent
of the enrollees graduated from private high schools, and voucher high school grad-
uates account for 54 percent. To get a sense of the selection into college, we report
the ratio of college enrollees over the total number of high school seniors in a given
type of high schools. Note that the ratio may exceed 100 percent because high
Low, and Low. Therefore, a high school’s category does not depend directly on the high school
ownership type, but rather on the characteristics of its students. Table 3.2 shows the distribution
of high school types given an SES category using the 2012 MOE data. For example, among the
lowest SES high schools, public high schools account for 79%, while the remaining 21% are voucher
high schools. The table shows that on average students from private high schools come from higher
SES families while students from public high schools have on average the lowest SES.
117
school graduates may take some time off before applying to college. The reported
ratio in the second row shows that the share of high school graduates enrolling in
a university is much larger at private high schools, followed by voucher schools and
then public high schools. We use both raw PSU scores and standardized scores, i.e.,
standardized PSU scores among new enrollees in each year. There is a noticeable dif-
ference in average test scores of enrollees between private high schools and the rest.
However, the variation within a type is so large that the distributions of enrollees’
scores overlap. Panel B reports the average characteristics of the options enrollees
signed up for in the period 2010-2013. Students from private high schools enrolled
in relatively better-ranked programs (higher prestige) and were much more likely
to enroll a non-CRUCH college. On the other hand, students coming from voucher
and public schools were substantially less likely to enroll a college that joined the
centralized system in 2012.
3.5.3 Empirical Strategy
We use two strategies to examine model predictions. One is based on sim-
ple statistics comparing the outcomes before and after the 2011 admission system
change. Specifically, we split our data into two periods: 2010-2011 and 2012-2013.
The period between 2012 and 2013 is under the new college admission regime, in
which the 8 non-CRUCH universities joined the centralized matching (i.e., post-
period). We select the same number of years right before the change, i.e., 2010 and
2011, to study the decisions and outcomes of universities and students under the
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Panel A. Enrollees characteristics
Number of enrollees 84,091 240,139 117,656
(% of high school seniors) 119.82% 71.00% 35.62%
PSU scores
- Raw 633.71 560.02 553.53
(std.) (79.66) (73.62) (79.09)
- Standardized 0.76 -0.14 -0.22
(std.) (0.97) (0.90) (0.96)
% in metropolitan areas (MA) 78.80% 63.96% 54.49%
Panel B. Enrollment outcomes
Prestige: mean 75.2 52.56 50.92
(std.) (25.41) (29.15) (29.63)
University type (%)
- CRUCH 44.71% 47.69% 52.76%
- NC: join 40.82% 13.10% 7.93%
- NC: not join 14.47% 39.20% 39.31%
Location of university: college in MA (%) 99.09% 97.78% 97.15%
- students from the MA 66.26% 28.22% 22.65%
- students outside of the MA 75.2 52.56 50.92
Source: Authors calculations using data from SIES. Note: Unit of observations is
student who enrolled in a university between 2010 and 2013. Metropolitan areas
include students and universities located in regions V, VIII and XIII. “NC: join”
includes 7 (out of 8) non-CRUCH colleges that eventually join the coordinated
assignment in 2012, while “NC: not join” includes the rest of the non-CRUCH
colleges (n=23).
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old admission system (i.e., pre-period). Comparing the pre and post-periods can
help us understand the impact of the change in the college admission system on
students and universities. In our analysis, we present two sets of results – one based
on summary statistics and the other based on regression analysis. Although the
results are consistent across the two sets, the former is straightforward, informing
us about the overall trends, while the latter can control for various differences in
characteristics among universities and college applicants.
We acknowledge that our empirical strategies do not guarantee causal inference
of the policy impacts. That is, factors other than the 2012 policy change may
account for some of the differences between the pre and post-period. We employ
two methods to examine the severity of this concern. The first is to show that there
is no time trend before the 2012 change. For this purpose, we use the rest of sample
period (i.e., 2007 to 2009) and show that between the 2007-2009 and 2010 and 2011
periods, there is no systematic change in outcomes (conditional on some controls).
The second method is to document that there is no other policy change that may
account for our findings.
3.6 Empirical Findings
3.6.1 CRUCH’s incentives for adoption and expansion of the central-
ized admission
First, we examine what motivated CRUCH to form a centralized admission
system in the first place. At the time CRUCH universities decided to institute cen-
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tralized matching, they were highly concentrated. Specifically, in 1967, there were
only 8 CRUCH universities that later were split into 25 universities.13 Among these
8 universities, 2 public universities comprised 60 percent of the student enrollees;
the remaining 6 universities, which were private, were controlled by the Catholic
Church in Chile.14 The higher education sector was relatively small and mostly
elites had access to it. There was a high degree of homogeneity in terms of student
socio-economic and cultural background, and overall universities were comparable
to one another in most respects (see Bernasconi and Rojas, 2003). Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume two groups of universities, comparable to each other in terms
of student share, to compete against each other.
Next, we consider the CRUCH’s incentives and the timing of inviting non-
CRUCH to join the centralized admission system. As most non-CRUCH univer-
sities were established by 1990, the CRUCH universities could have invited them
to join their centralized matching much earlier. However, they did not do so until
2012. In our theoretical framework, we show that the net benefit of inviting non-
CRUCH increases if the non-CRUCH play a bigger role when CRUCH compete for
a similar student body against non-CRUCH. In this section, we present evidence
13The year 1967 coincides with the time when the Chilean government introduced a standardized
college entrance test called “Prueba de Aptitud Académica (PAA).” The PAA is a predecessor of
PSU: both were multiple choice exams.
14The two public universities are Universidad de Chile and Universidad Técnica del Estado
The six private universities are Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile, Universidad Católica
del Norte, Universidad Católica de Valparaíso Universidad Austral, Universidad Técnica Federico
Santa María, Universidad de Concepción.
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supporting that this is indeed the case.15 Figure 3.2 shows the market share of the
non-CRUCH universities relative to the CRUCH. The solid line represents the aver-
age size of non-CRUCH universities measured by the number of enrollees, while the
line market with triangles represents that of CRUCH universities. Overall, the num-
ber of enrollees has been increasing in both CRUCH and non-CRUCH universities
because the college enrollment rate in Chile has been steadily growing16. However,
the non-CRUCH universities show faster growth compared to CRUCH universities
(i.e., steeper slope), leading to the rise in their share among college enrollees, from
15.2% percent in 1990 to 54.1% percent in 2013 (solid line in 3.1). Figure 3.3, Panel
A, shows the quality of enrollees that CRUCH and non-CRUCH universities at-
15We obtained the minutes of meetings among CRUCH universities that took place on January
11, 2011 and April 5, 2011 (Sessions 521 and 523). The minutes of the January meeting state
that the CRUCH has the mission of guaranteeing that students and their families have access to
accurate information in terms of the number of vacancies and minimum scores among enrollees.
They also state that college admission outcomes should be based only on merit. In Spanish, the
sentences read as below: "...los Rectores consideran que el Consejo de Rectores tiene la misión
de proponer políticas al sistema universitario en su conjunto. Al mismo tiempo, que les cabe la
responsabilidad de garantizar information y calidad a los estudiantes y sus familias", and "..al
mismo tiempo se vota la decisión de invitar a las universidades privadas a integrarse al sistema
de admisión del CRUCH, con explicitación de vacantes, puntajes de corte y admisión única según
los méritos de los estudiantes."
16For example, the gross college enrollment rate, defined as "total enrollment in tertiary educa-
tion (ISCED 5 to 8), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the
five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving," was 20.9 % in 1991, 37,2% in
2000, and 78.6 percent in 2013. (The World Bank Databank)
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tracted over time. Specifically, we calculate the average PSU scores among enrollees
in a given year and university and take the weighted average across universities
among CRUCH or non-CRUCH groups, with the weights based on the number of
enrollees. We also plot the 5th to 95th percentile of the average PSU scores with
the line graph. Figure 3.3 shows that the CRUCH’s distribution of the PSU scores
overlap with those of the non-CRUCH schools, particularly with those who joined
the centralized admission in 2012.
3.6.2 Non-CRUCH’s incentive to participate in the centralized admis-
sion
As our theoretical model illustrates, the benefit for a non-CRUCH to join
the centralized system arises when the non-CRUCH competes against CRUCH to
attract students. Therefore, among non-CRUCH universities, those that are com-
parable to CRUCH are more likely to join the centralized matching system. Our
data shows that indeed that is the case. Specifically, we compare average character-
istics of universities among CRUCH, the 7 non-CRUCH that joined the centralized
matching, and the remaining non-CRUCH that did not join.17 Herein, we refer to
them as Types 1 to 3, respectively. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.4 report the average
characteristics of universities across types. The first two groups are on average com-
parable to each other, while the CRUCH and the non-CRUCH that decided not to
17One university that joined the system, "Universidad Mayor", did not report the information to
the Ministry of Education. This is why our empirical analysis only includes 7 out of 8 non-CRUCH
universities that joined the system.
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Note: The solid line shows the share of non-CRUCH universities out of new
university enrollees in each college admission cycle (left y-axis). The line marked
with triangles (∆) shows the average university size (total enrollees) across
CRUCH universities, while the line marked with circles (O) shows the average
university size across non-CRUCH universities (right y-axis).
Source: SIES, Ministry of Education of Chile.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison: CRUCH vs. Non-CRUCH













2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CRUCH NC: Join NC: Not Join
Note: The unit of observation is university by year. For each observation the average PSU (raw
score) is calculated. This figure shows the simple average of those averages among the 25
CRUCH (∆), 7 non-CRUCH that joined the system in 2012 (O) and 23 non-CRUCH that did
not join the system (x) for different years. The 25th and 75th percentile are showed in bars.












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CRUCH NC: Join NC: Not Join
Note: The unit of observation is university by year. For each observation the number of new
enrollees is calculated (size). This figure shows the simple average of the size among the 25
CRUCH (∆), 7 non-CRUCH that joined the system in 2012 (O) and 23 non-CRUCH that did
not join the system (x) for different years. The 25th and 75th percentile are showed in bars.
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join the matching are much more different from each other. The differences between
the first two groups are often statistically insignificant at conventional levels, while
the differences between the first and the last groups are significant at the 1 percent
level, except for a few cases.
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Table 3.4: Who Accepted the Invitation?
CRUCH Non-CRUCH Diff Diff
Join the system (no. of universities) Yes (25) Yes (7) No (23) (1) vs (2) (1) vs. (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. 2010-2011
No. majors offered 32.78 24.5 19.72 8.28** 13.06***
No. new enrollees 2179.42 2642.5 1873.63 -463.08 305.79
PSU of new enrollees*
- Mean: Raw 587.79 610.74 497.21 -22.95* 90.58***
- Mean: Standardized 0.18 0.46 -0.92 -0.28* 1.10***
Sum of PSU
- Raw scores (x 1000) 1,266.91 1,443.42 818.22 -176.51 448.70**
- Standardized scores 904.63 599.12 -1165.63 305.51 2,070.26***
Share of students aged over 20 24.51% 23.08% 45.54% 1.42% -21.04% pts***
Tuition (2009 USD) 4,091.87 6,541.59 3,940.43 -2,449.72*** 151.44
Panel B. 2012-2013
No. majors offered 33.98 27.57 19.35 6.41 14.63***
No. new enrollees 2,237.08 2,916.00 1,684.52 -678.92 552.56
PSU of new enrollees*
- Mean: Raw 579.22 607.46 486.09 -28.24** 93.13***
- Mean: Standardized 0.11 0.46 -1.04 -0.35** 1.15***
Sum of PSU
- Raw scores (x 1000) 1,246.65 1,528.26 661.38 -281.61 585.26***
- Standardized scores 786.58 664.31 -1,057.16 122.27 1,843.74***
Share of students aged over 20 24.48% 22.16% 48.98% 2.32% -24.50% pts***
Tuition (2009 USD) 4,320.00 6,770.44 3,955.43 -2,450.45*** 364.57*
Note: The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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3.6.3 Payoffs of Universities
This section examines the outcomes of the CRUCH and the 7 non-CRUCH
universities when they joined the centralized matching. Given that these universi-
ties voluntarily adopted the system change, the change would benefit them. First
consider CRUCH universities. We calculate the prevalence of applicants who got
admitted but did not enroll, implying that, from a college’s point of view, those
seats were wasted, lowering its payoffs. Using the application data, we calculate
the list of applicants who got an admission from CRUCH using the Gale-Shapley
algorithm. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the PSU distribution of students who applied
to and got the admission from a CRUCH university (labeled “applications”) and
that of students who actually accepted the offer (labeled “enrollment”). The dif-
ference between the two distributions is the number of seats that could have been
filled by other students but were wasted, implying the costs from a college’s point of
view. Figure 3.4 presents graphs for 2010 and 2011, before the change, and Figure
3.5 shows the graphs for 2012 and 2013, after the centralization expanded. These
graphs illustrate that the number of unfilled seats dramatically decreased after the
2012 change. For example, in 2011, 14.8% of offers were rejected by applications
(i.e., the share of white areas relative to the outer distribution in 2011). In contrast,
in 2012, that share decreased by half (7.7%).
Next, we use regression analyses to measure payoffs of CRUCH as well as non-
CRUCH universities. Again, consistent with our theoretical model, we measure a
university’s payoff by the simple sum of the enrollees’ PSU scores. From 2010 to
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Note: PSU distribution of students who applied to and got the admission from a
CRUCH university (applications) and that of students who actually accepted the
offer (enrollment). The difference between the two distributions (white area) is the
number of seats left empty.
129





































Note: PSU distribution of students who applied to and got the admission from a
CRUCH university (applications) and that of students who actually accepted the
offer (enrollment). The difference between the two distributions (white area) is the
number of seats left empty.
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2013, we regress the sum of the PSU scores of a college’s enrollees on a college-
specific dummy (i.e., college fixed effects), year dummy, and the interaction terms
between whether a college admission took place after the 2012 change and the types
of colleges. Specifically, we estimate the following regression model:
Yc,t = α + βi × Postt × 1(Typec = i) + θc + µt + εc,t (3.16)
where Yc,t is the payoff of college c whose type is i in year t , and Postt is a
dummy equal to 1 if t ≥ 2012 (post-change period). Typec is a categorical variable
that specifies college c’s type, that is, 1 if college c is CRUCH, 2 if one of the 8
non-CRUCH, and 3 for the rest of non-CRUCH and 1() is the indicator funtion.
Parameter θc captures a college-specific effect (i.e., a college fixed effect), and µt is
year fixed effect. The parameter of interest is βi. If our theoretical prediction holds,
then β1 and β2 will be positive. Parameter β3 measures the change of payoffs among
non-CRUCH that did not join the centralized admission. The difference between βi
with i = 1, 2 and β3 captures the relative change in payoffs for CRUCH and the 8
non-CRUCH.
Table 3.5 presents three panels depending on the range of samples. Panel A
uses the entire universities, while Panels B and C use half of them depending on the
initial quality of schools. Column (1) of Panel A shows that, after the 2012 change,
the average CRUCH payoff slightly increased (i.e., 5.06) but the increase is not
statistically significant at conventional level, while the non-CRUCH universities that
joined the centralized admission (labeled “non-CRUCH: join”) on average increased
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their payoffs (i.e., 110.48), significant at the 10 percent level. In contrast, the non-
CRUCH universities that did not join the centralized admission substantially suffer
by a reduction in their average payoffs that is substantially different from zero at
the 1 percent level. As this analysis does not account for the fact that there is
a substantial difference in initial quality among CRUCH schools, we divide the
sample into two groups and repeat the regression analysis. Panel B includes the top
half of the universities based on the average PSU scores among enrollees prior to our
sample period (i.e., 2007 to 2009), while Panel C includes the remaining bottom 50%
of schools. The top 50% group includes only some CRUCH and the non-CRUCH
that joined the centralized admission (Type 2), while the bottom 50% includes only
the rest of CRUCH and the non-CRUCH that did not join the centralized admission
(Type 3). Once we condition on the initial quality of schools, we can clearly see
that the subset of CRUCH universities that directly compete against the Type 2
non-CRUCH increased their payoffs (column (1) of Panel B). The rest of CRUCH
schools that compete againts the Type 3 non-CRUCH show a reduction in their
payoffs but insignificantly.
Table 3.6 shows similar results but we control for the the time-variant number
of students receiving AFI subsidy. Both sets of analyses suggest that, consistent with
our theoretical model, CRUCH and the non-CRUCH that joined the centralized
admission benefit from the expansion of the centralized admission.
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Table 3.5: University Outcomes: Regression Analysis
Outcome Sum of PSU # of Enrollees Avg PSU # of Enrollees
(unit) (1,000 points) (person) (1 point) with AFI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All Universities
Post x CRUCH (a) 5.06 23.24 -10.95*** 1.45
(40.12) (75.16) (1.36) (15.96)
x non-CRUCH: join (b) 110.48* 239.55* -5.68** 71.37***
(62.05) (130.57) (2.65) (26.54)
x non-CRUCH: not join (c) -131.28*** -223.13*** -13.61*** 6.05
(38.40) (80.80) (1.64) (16.43)
Test (p-val)
(a) = (b) 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.01
(a) = (c) 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.81
(b) = (c) <0.001 0.00 <0.001 0.02
Mean Dep. V. 1069.77 2101.49 548.32 448.90
R2 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00
N 220.00 220.00 220.00 220.00
Panel B: Top 50% Univ.
Post x CRUCH (a) 71.30*** 138.22*** -10.88*** 16.91
(9.59) (17.80) (0.33) (27.27)
x non-CRUCH: join (b) 167.59*** 336.36*** -4.41** 89.41**
(46.08) (90.66) (1.68) (39.21)
x non-CRUCH: not join (c) - - -
Test (p-val)
(a) = (b) 0.04 0.03 <0.001 0.08
Mean Dep. V. 1448.09 2553.45 599.31 867.50
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
N 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00
Panel C: Bottom 50% Univ.
Post x CRUCH (a) -86.56 -142.79 -7.40* -5.65
(70.60) (174.90) (2.69) (6.43)
x non-CRUCH: join (b) - - - -
x non-CRUCH: not join (c) -186.35*** -316.48*** -14.84*** -11.34***
(50.55) (111.22) (2.33) (3.73)
Test (p-val)
(a) = (c) 0.26 0.37 0.07 0.76
Mean Dep. V. 704.96 1665.67 499.15 43.65
R2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99
N 112.00 112.00 112.00 112.00
Note: The unit of observation is university by year. As for Panels B and C, we split the colleges
into two groups based on the average PSU scores among enrollees using out-of-sample data
between 2007 and 2009. Panel A includes the top 50% of colleges based on the average PSU
scores and the bottom 50% covers the remaining colleges. Regression models additionally include
university fixed effects and year fixed effects. We also control for the time-variant number of
students receiving AFI subsidy. Standard errors are clustered by year. The asterisks *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 3.6: University Outcomes: Regression Analysis
Outcome Sum of PSU # of Enrollees Avg PSU # of Enrollees
(unit) (1,000 points) (person) (1 point) with AFI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All Universities
Post x CRUCH (a) 26.1 62.43 -9.73*** 8.94
(34.37) (70.87) (1.22) (16.69)
x non-CRUCH: join (b) 95.64* 198.02* -5.78*** 69.78**
(56.24) (115.98) (2.00) (27.31)
x non-CRUCH: not join (c) -64.18 -51.73 -8.79*** 34.75
(43.37) (89.44) (1.54) (21.06)
log(AFI subsidy) 238.98*** 537.48*** 8.78*** 60.53***
(38) (78) (1) (18)
Test (p-val)
(a) = (b) 0.247 0.273 0.065 0.038
(a) = (c) 0.046 0.226 0.562 0.245
(b) = (c) 0.015 0.065 0.195 0.27
Mean Dep. V. 1,069.77 2,101.49 548.32 448.9
R2 0.99 0.99 1 1
N 200 200 200 200
Panel B: Top 50% Univ.
Post x CRUCH (a) 64.63** 125.17** -11.29*** 8.83
(30.70) (60.44) (1.00) (24.60)
x non-CRUCH: join (b) 125.51*** 254.01*** -7.02*** 38.5
(46.35) (91.24) (1.50) (37.14)
x non-CRUCH: not join (c) - - -
- - - -
log(AFI subsidy) 241.84*** 473.24*** 15.03*** 292.58***
(83.44) (164.27) (2.71) (66.87)
Test (p-val)
(a) = (b) 0.208 0.169 0.007 0.435
Mean Dep. V. 1448.09 2553.45 599.31 867.5
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
N 108 108 108 108
Panel C: Bottom 50% Univ.
Post x CRUCH (a) -54.75 -69.93 -4.86 -2.64
(85.45) (182.80) (3.11) (6.30)
x non-CRUCH: join (b) - - - -
- - - -
x non-CRUCH: not join (c) -130.41* -142.56 -9.15*** -5.13
(65.59) (140.32) (2.39) (4.83)
log(AFI subsidy) 204.49*** 497.22*** 7.92*** 17.73***
(51.85) (110.93) (1.89) (3.82)
Test (p-val)
(a) = (c) 0.396 0.702 0.188 0.704
Mean Dep. V. 704.96 1665.67 499.15 43.65
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99
N 92 92 92 92
Note: The unit of observation is university by year. As for Panels B and C, we split the colleges into two groups
based on the average PSU scores among enrollees using out-of-sample data between 2007 and 2009. Panel A
includes the top 50% of colleges based on the average PSU scores and the bottom 50% covers the remaining
colleges. Regression models additionally include university fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are




Our theoretical model predicts that, conditional on test scores, students facing
high application costs are disadvantageous relative to their counterparts with low
costs. Specifically, they are less likely to apply to colleges with separate applica-
tions, and due to the difference in application behaviors, they will be more likely
to enroll in a university and major that is less prestigious than those of their coun-
terparts. However, when the set of universities covered by the centralized matching
expands, this premium decreases. In the Chilean setting, it is reasonable to assume
that students whose parents are well enough off to cover the deposit fees and those
who live in metropolitan areas face smaller opportunity costs. To proxy for parental
background, we use high school type, expecting that private school graduates would
be better off than the rest. Figure 3.6 shows the existence of the premiums. Specifi-
cally, we classify students based on their PSU scores (by decile) and high school type
(private, public, and voucher). Conditional on a decile, the average PSU scores are
comparable across the three high school types. Figure 3.6 shows that even if stu-
dents have the same PSU scores, students from private schools were able to enroll in
better-ranked options compared to those from voucher or public schools. However,
the gap is reduced in 2012-13 compared to 2010-11, especially for middle-ranged
students ranging from the third decile (D3) to the 8th decile (D8).
Table 3.7 presents the empirical analysis of students’ outcomes before and after
the change. Specifically, we regress the prestige of the option a student enrolled in
135
Figure 3.6: Student Outcomes: Before and After the Change
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Note: This figure shows the simple average and 25th-75th interval of the “prestige”
of options (university and major) for which new enrollees signed up, depending on
the types of high schools they graduated from. The symbols ∆ , O and X, indicate
private, voucher, and public high schools, respectively.
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as student’s PSU score, high school type, and other controls as follows:
Yi,t = α+β×Scorei,t+γ×HighSchooli,t+δ×Postt×HighSchooli,t+θ×Xi,t+εi,t
(3.17)
where Yi,t is either the prestige of the program student i enrolls in year t
(columns 1-3) or the probability that student i enrolls at a Type 2 college in year i.
Scorei,t is the PSU score of student i enrolls in year t, HighSchooli is a categorical
variable defining her high school type (private, voucher or public), Xi,t is a vector
of student’s characteristic, including gender, age, location, and finally Postt is a
dummy equal to 1 if t ≥ 2012 (post-reform period), which is interacted with the
high school variable.
Table 3.7 (column (1)) shows that, after the change, students from public and
voucher high schools enroll in programs with a higher prestige (4.99 and 4.81 points,
respectively), roughly 2.5 points higher than students from private schools. Recall
that our measure of prestige is based on relative ranking of an option, ranging from
0 to 100. Therefore, the estimated results can be interpreted as follows. After the
2012 change, a student from public high school is able to enroll in a college and
major that ranked 5 percentiles higher. Note that students from private schools
still benefit from the 2012 change in that the ranking of their enrolled options
increases by 2.6 percentiles. This increase is due to the fact that fewer offers are
wasted after the 2012 change (see Section 3.6.3). We conduct the same analysis by
splitting the samples depending on whether a student resides in one of the three
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metropolitan areas (MA) where at least one of the 8 non-CRUCH universities are
located. Columns (2) and (3) show the results. In both groups, we find comparable
improvement in outcomes.
Columns (4) to (6) show the likelihood of enrolling in a non-CRUCH university
that joined the centralized admission. As we showed in Section 5.3, those non-
CRUCH schools increased the size of their enrollment. The purpose of these analyses
is to examine whether these seats are filled by students from a certain type of
high school more often or not. The estimated coefficients show that students from
voucher high schools are more likely to enroll in a Type 2 non-CRUCH school
relative to those from private or public schools. However, the difference is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. When we study students residing in
one of the three metropolitan areas (MA, column (6)), the effect becomes statistically
significant at the 1 percent level but the estimate is not statistically from the effect
on students from public schools (i.e., 0.009 vs. 0.007).
3.7 Discussion
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our analysis with respect to our
choice of student outcomes, namely “prestige.” First, we construct our prestige rank-
ing not based on average PSU scores among enrollees, but based on two alternative
statistics: the minimum and maximum PSU scores among enrollees in a given op-
tion. Table 3.8 presents the results, consistent with the baseline results reported
in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.7. Specifically, after the 2012 change, on average all
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Table 3.7: Student Outcomes: Regression Analysis
Outcome Prestige Prestige Prestige Enrolling Enrolling Enrolling
in Type 2 in Type 2 in Type 2
Sample All In MA Outside MA All In MA Outside MA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post
x Private (a) 2.559** 2.473** 2.892*** -0.009 -0.012 0
(0.489) (0.499) (0.465) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
x Voucher (b) 4.806** 5.035** 4.389** 0.018 0.023 0.009***
(0.919) (0.938) (0.891) (0.008) (0.012) (0.001)
x Public (c) 4.991*** 5.243*** 4.673** 0.011 0.016 0.007
(0.837) (0.625) (1.106) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Test Score(PSU) 0.273*** 0.276*** 0.266*** -0.000** -0.000*** 0
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Voucher -4.285*** -4.690*** -2.849*** -0.263*** -0.277*** -0.225***
(0.206) (0.182) (0.380) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Public -3.406*** -3.875*** -2.195** -0.295*** -0.310*** -0.251***
(0.196) (0.118) (0.442) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Girl -1.711** -1.484** -2.127*** 0.007* 0.006* 0.009**
(0.373) (0.390) (0.356) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Age>20 -3.472*** -3.142*** -4.026*** -0.026*** -0.042*** 0.002
(0.240) (0.286) (0.188) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Test (p-val)
(a) = (b) 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.2 0.17 0.56
(a) = (c) 0.01 0 0.07 0.25 0.17 0.72
(b) = (c) 0.27 0.61 0.29 0.04 0.19 0.59
Mean Dep. V. 55.85 58.82 51.08 0.17 0.23 0.08
R2 0.6 0.62 0.57 0.13 0.1 0.11
N 376,272 242,468 133,804 376,272 242,468 133,804
Note: We also include students’ location fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered by year. The unit of observations is students enrolled in a university between 2010 and
2013. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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students are able to enroll in a better-ranked options and this positive impact is
larger for students who graduated from voucher or public high schools as compared
to their counterparts who graduated from private high schools. Second, we exam-
ine the extent to which our measure of prestige may reflect students’ preferences.
Suppose that a student’s preference over options is determined by the common and
idiosyncratic components of an option. We consider the average PSU scores as a
proxy for the former, the value of an option that is commonly shared by college
applicants. Therefore, we view our empirical results regarding student outcomes
as average impacts because students’ idiosyncratic values of an option may be can-
celled out across individuals. However, our argument will be valid if the average
PSU scores indeed well reflect the relative ranking of the value of common com-
ponents. Specifically, due to application costs for non-CRUCH universities, it is
possible that an option may be well-demanded by students but have a lower av-
erage PSU score than another option that is less preferred. That is, our measure
of prestige will be valid if search frictions do not alter the relative ranking of an
option with respect to the average PSU score. We examine this possibility using the
application data as follows. Specifically, we use the 2012 application information
on CRUCH and the 8 non-CRUCH universities under the centralized matching to
compare students’ preference ranking with our measure of prestige. Recall that the
Chilean matching employs the student-proposed Deferred-Acceptance algorithm (or
Gale-Shapley algorithm), under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy for par-
ticipants. Therefore, if our measure of prestige well reflects students’ preferences,
then it will be positively correlated with students’ preference ranking. To test this
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possibility, for each option, we calculate the fraction of applicants who rank it as
their best or second-best option (i.e., rank number 1 or 2); the fraction of applicants
who rank it as number 3 or 4; and 5 or above. By construction, the sum of these
three variables is one within option. We then regress our measure of prestige on the
former two variables. If our hypothesis is true, then the estimated coefficient of %
Ranking 1-2 will be larger than that of % Ranking 3-4; and % Ranking 5-10 will
be the smallest (which is out omitted category). The regression results are reported
in Table 3.9. In column (1), we regress our prestige on the two regressors; we add
field-fixed effects in column (2); we add university-fixed effects in column (3); and
we use both field- and university- fixed effects in column (4). In all specifications,
we find positive correlation of the ranking of an option in the application data with
our measure of prestige. For example, in column (1), the result shows that a one
percentage point increase in the share of applicants who select an option as rank
number 1 or 2, while decreasing the share of those who rank it as number 5 or
higher, is associated with a 0.984 increase in our measure of prestige (2.0 percent).
Similarly, a one percentage point increase in the share of applicants who select an
option as rank number 3 or 4, while decreasing the share of those who rank it as
number 5 or higher, is associated with a 0.977 increase in our measure of prestige
(1.9 percent).
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Table 3.8: Alterative Measures of Prestige
Outcome Min PSU Min PSU Min PSU Max PSU Max PSU Max PSU
Sample All In MA Outside MA All In MA Outside MA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post
x Private (a) 2.319** 2.331** 2.266** 1.722** 1.545** 2.382***
(0.513) (0.530) (0.474) (0.424) (0.471) (0.276)
x Voucher (b) 3.815** 3.986** 3.499** 3.457** 3.559** 3.259***
(0.821) (0.814) (0.830) (0.727) (0.830) (0.556)
x Public (c) 3.892** 4.361*** 3.300** 3.765** 3.767*** 3.745**
(0.708) (0.555) (0.930) (0.734) (0.568) (0.955)
Test Score (PSU) 0.268*** 0.272*** 0.259*** 0.188*** 0.193*** 0.179***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Voucher -0.175 -0.096 -0.359 -7.626*** -7.966*** -6.305***
(0.306) (0.339) (0.269) (0.098) (0.154) (0.186)
Public 1.979*** 1.933*** 1.690** -7.875*** -8.064*** -7.095***
(0.301) (0.266) (0.343) (0.071) (0.175) (0.410)
Girl -2.288** -1.656** -3.449*** -2.755*** -2.301*** -3.581***
(0.411) (0.422) (0.405) (0.199) (0.206) (0.196)
Age>20 -2.954*** -2.518*** -3.728*** -2.847*** -2.663*** -3.145***
(0.313) (0.258) (0.425) (0.267) (0.320) (0.182)
Test (p-val)
(a) = (b) 0.052 0.043 0.057 0.011 0.014 0.089
(a) = (c) 0.021 0.002 0.142 0.007 0 0.174
(b) = (c) 0.589 0.327 0.173 0.126 0.499 0.325
Mean Dep. V. 48.3 50.67 44.49 62.53 64.85 58.79
R2 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.34
N 374,103 241,467 132,636 374,103 241,467 132,636
Note: We also include students’ location fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered by year. The unit of observations is students enrolled in a university between 2010 and
2013. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper examines schools’ incentives to voluntarily form a centralized ad-
mission system and to expand the number of participants when application costs
exist and a student’s ability to afford these costs varies. Our theoretical analysis
shows that when application costs are sufficiently large and colleges are compa-
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Table 3.9: Prestige and Preference Ranking in Applications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Ranking 1-2 (a) 0.984*** 0.994*** 0.704*** 0.666***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
% Ranking 3-4 (b) 0.977*** 0.973*** 0.367*** 0.372***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
% Ranking 5-10 (omitted)
Field Fixed-Effect NO YES NO YES
University Fixed-Effect NO NO YES YES
Test (p-val)
(a) = (b) 0.959 0.859 0.012 0.017
Mean Dep. V. 50.46 50.46 50.46 50.46
R2 0.15 0.26 0.26 0.63
N 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327
Note: The unit of observation is option. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
rable enough in terms of their qualities, colleges may voluntarily adopt a central-
ized admission, and also that the group of colleges using the centralized admission
may expand the group by including new market participants. Using administrative
datasets from Chile, we show the relevance of the theoretical model in explaining
the evolution of college admission procedures. Furthermore, we empirically examine
the consequences of an expansion of the centralized admission in 2012. The expan-
sion is beneficial not only to colleges that participate in the centralized admission
but also to applicants, particularly those of low socioeconomic status (SES), who
are able to enroll in higher quality schools. The impact on applicants is accounted
for by the efficiency improvement due to coordination among colleges, and also by
the fact that applicants of low SES are less likely to be able to afford application
costs in Chile. Our findings suggest that consideration of application costs, or gen-
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erally speaking search costs, may be important in examining potential benefits from
a market design intervention. When search costs are negligible, as in secondary
school assignment problems in the US, incentives for schools to adopt a centralized
admission system can be small because doing so only increases competition against
other schools. In such a case, government intervention and associated compensa-
tion is necessary. In contrast, our study suggests that a centralized system can be
more adoptable in a market with high search costs, such as developing countries or
countries with high inequality. This paper also shows that a market design policy
can play an important role in reducing inefficiency and inequality. Chile’s expansion
of its centralized admission system in 2012 increased the fraction of seats allocated
through the centralized admission from 47 percent to 63 percent. This suggests that
a student can apply to a much wider set of colleges without paying any applica-
tion costs. This reduction in application costs is beneficial to students in general,
but much more so to students from a low socioeconomic background. Our findings
suggest that search costs affect agents’ outcomes depending on the extent to which
their resources cover the costs, even if two agents are of equal quality. Reducing
search costs using the centralized admission diminishes the role of irrelevant charac-
teristics, namely parental background, in determining the agents’ outcomes, which
could be useful to economies attempting to improve intergenerational mobility or
representation of minorities in higher education.
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Appendix A: Decentralized Admission Process
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Figure A.1: Decentralized Admission Process
The photos shows the chaos in the decentralized application. Students line up in
front of universities (top figure) the night before the scores are released to secure a
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